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ABSTRACT
This study examines a legal experiment that occurred during the height of the
global financial crisis. As markets from the United States to Europe to the Global
South shook, one country – the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) – found itself on the
brink of economic collapse. In particular, in 2009 the U.A.E.’s Emirate of Dubai
(Emirate) was contemplating defaulting on $60 billion of debt it had amassed. Recognizing that such a default would have cataclysmic reverberations across the
globe, Dubai’s governmental leaders turned to a small group of foreign lawyers,
judges, accountants, and business consultants for assistance. Working in a coordinated fashion, these external and internal actors soon imported into the Emirate a
new regime of insolvency laws – and even an Anglo-American insolvency court –
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to help resolve Dubai’s financial troubles. Drawing upon elite theory scholarship,
as well as on primary and secondary sources of data, this study argues that traditional ways of analyzing foreign influences on a domestic landscape need to be refined and further nuanced to consider such important comparative cases as Dubai.

I.

INTRODUCTION

More than eight years have passed since Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy
in the United States. The scale of Lehman’s downfall in autumn 2008, and its effects on markets around the globe, has continued to intrigue scholars, policymakers,
private sector stakeholders, and the media. 1 Escaping attention from many observers, however, is that about one year after Lehman collapsed, another global financial
institution was on the brink of failing. The Dubai World Corporation (Dubai
World), based in the United Arab Emirates (in the Emirate of Dubai), is a government owned holding company that by November 2009 had incurred nearly $60 billion in debt.2 During its peak, Dubai World employed more than 100,000 workers
and had some 200 subsidiaries worldwide. 3 Yet by the late fourth quarter of 2009,
Dubai World informed its existing creditors that it would not be able to service its
debts until the following year.4
This announcement caused massive waves. Markets in Europe, Asia, and the
United States tumbled; investment agencies downgraded Dubai; and there was great
fear that a default by the Dubai government would have lasting negative ramifications for the Middle East and other international markets. 5 Furthermore, experts

1. For a sample of works on this subject, see generally KEN AULETTA, GREED AND GLORY ON WALL
STREET: THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LEHMAN (2015) (discussing the history of Lehman Brothers and
what led to its downfall after the 2008 financial crisis); Christian Hofmann, Central Bank Collateral and
the Lehman Collapse, 6 CAPITAL MKTS. L.J. 256 (2011) (examining how the Lehman collapse had reverberating effects on European markets); PETER CHAPMAN, THE LAST OF THE IMPERIOUS RICH:
LEHMAN BROTHERS, 1844-2008 (2010) (providing a narrative of how Henry and Emmanuel Lehman
built their company); Charles Hines et al., An Analysis of Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy and Repo 105
Transactions, 26 AM. J. BUS. 40 (2011) (investigating how Lehman used Repo 105 transactions to continue leveraging the value of its business); Chitru S. Fernando et al., The Value of Investment Banking
Relationships: Evidence from the Collapse of Lehman Brothers, 67 J. FIN. 235 (2011) (examining how
firms that depended upon Lehman’s services were affected by its collapse).
2. See Michael D. Nolan et al., Leviathan on Life Support? Restructuring Sovereign Debt and International Investment Protection after Abaclat, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW &
POLICY 2011-2012, at 532 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2013); TODD A. KNOOP, GLOBAL FINANCE IN EMERGING
MARKET ECONOMIES 202 (2013).
3. Christopher Hall et al., Shifting sands: Insolvency and restructuring law reform in the Middle
East, MONDAQ (May 29, 2012), http://www.mondaq.com/x/179356/Insolvency,+Administration,+Bankruptcy+and+Liquidation/Shifting+Sands+Insolvency+And+Restructuring+Law+Reform+In+The+Middle+East; REGULATING THE VISIBLE HAND?: THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
CHINESE STATE CAPITALISM 425 (Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt eds., 2015) (chart of Dubai
World subsidiaries).
4. Specifically, May of 2010. See Matt Smith & Enjy Kiwan, Dubai seeks debt delay, some units
cut to junk, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/25/us-dubai-economyidUSTRE5AO4Z120091125#eK5PUSo4u0WZPySl.97.
5. See Laura Cochrane & Tal Barak Harif, Dubai Debt Delay Rattles Confidence in Gulf Borrowers,
INDEP. (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.independent.ie/business/world/dubai-debt-crisis-rattles-confidencein-persian-gulf-borrowers-26585888.html.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss2/8

2

Krishnan and Koster: An Innovative Matrix for Dispute Resolution: The Dubai World Trib

No. 2]

An Innovate Matrix

389

made ominous comparisons between these events in Dubai with what had occurred
during the Argentine economic crisis nearly a decade earlier. 6
Fortunately, a few weeks later, Dubai’s neighboring Emirate, Abu Dhabi, offered crucial financial assistance to Dubai World. A multi-billion dollar “lifeline”7
from the government of Abu Dhabi allowed Dubai World to meet critical shortterm obligations, and it helped set the stage for the corporation to begin the process
of seeking to re-structure its other debts.8 With Abu Dhabi coming to the rescue,
Dubai’s financial crisis had been temporarily averted, even though the terms of the
deal for the latter placed it under intense scrutiny from its various creditors, including Abu Dhabi itself.9
What caused Abu Dhabi to inject this infusion of capital into Dubai? A combination of factors appears to have made the difference. First, although tacit economic and political competition had long existed between the two,10 both governments understood that if they did not work together to address the financial crisis,
the entire federal republic was at risk of a major, long-term economic depression.11
Second, both governments have deep familial connections. Each respective ruling
family traces its roots to the Bani Yas clan, which came to the area that is now the
U.A.E. in the 1700s.12 Third, a decision undertaken by the Dubai government in
November and December of 2009, when the financial crisis was at its peak, arguably was the most important development that occurred. During this two-month period, Dubai quickly brought together experts from abroad to develop a creative legal
and insolvency-based framework aimed towards allaying the fears of creditors
clamoring for their money. Included within this framework was an important alternative dispute resolution tribunal intended to resolve cases between such creditors
and their corresponding debtors.
This study will focus on this last point. As the research below shall illustrate,
the Dubai government affirmatively opted to look for external assistance to cope
with its economic crisis. Rather than staying wedded to its traditional legal and
financial regimes, the government brought in outside experts who had knowledge,
talent, and experience in dealing with modern, complicated, cross-border insolvency emergencies. The narrative described below will support this paper’s thesis
that consultation with these external actors and the careful adoption of their ideas
helped to provide crucial credibility to the government at a significant moment in
its history.
To that end, Section II will set forth the theoretical frame within which the
paper will operate. Section III will then provide the history of how such actors from
6. See Experts Weigh In on Dubai Debt Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 27, 2009)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-11-27/experts-weigh-in-on-dubai-debt-crisis.
7. Landon Thomas, Jr., Abu Dhabi Tightens Its Grip as It Offers Help to Dubai, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
14, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/business/global/15dubai.html?_r=0.
8. Haris Anwar, Abu Dhabi Bails Out Dubai World With $10 Billion, LEBANON WIRE (Dec. 14,
2009), http://www.lebanonwire.com/0912MLN/09121410BB.asp.
9. Thomas, Jr., supra note 7.
10. Id. (noting how Abu Dhabi, on the one hand, is wealthier, has large amounts of natural oil resources, and is the federal capital of the country, while Dubai has been the hub of foreign investment
and is considered a more Western-friendly environment).
11. Margaret Coker, Dubai’s Rescue Boosts Others, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2009),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703442904574594972353375760.
12. Thomas, Jr., supra note 7. See also History: Bani Yas, HIS HIGHNESS SHEIKH MOHAMMED BIN
RASHID AL MAKTOUM, http://www.sheikhmohammed.com/vgn-ext-templating/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=499b4c8631cb4110VgnVCM100000b0140a0aRCRD (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).
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overseas – namely in this case, foreign lawyers, foreign judges, and foreign financial advisors – worked with Dubai’s leaders to draft a decree that established an
insolvency regime and accompanying adjudicatory tribunal that would serve as confidence-building measures for both international creditors and Dubai World. Section IV will evaluate how this judicial tribunal has functioned since its inception, as
well as how its jurisdiction has expanded beyond what was originally conceived by
the decree’s drafters. Section V will conclude by discussing what the situation is in
Dubai today, five years after the economic crisis hit. As this concluding section
will suggest, the cooperation between the external actors and Dubai’s government
staved-off a disastrous outcome for the Emirate, the U.A.E, and international markets. In sum, this story lends further support to the argument that external actors,
given the right conditions (and especially in the present globalized climate), can
indeed provide important tangible relief, not to mention legitimacy, to a state that
finds itself in need of both.

II.

ESTABLISHING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The above argument that external actors with special expertise can shape public
policy agendas of domestic governments is grounded in a discourse that has a long
tradition of academic scholarship. Frequently referred to as the “elite theory”
school of thought, this perspective has seen contributions from a diverse array of
scholars.13 The main principle guiding this theory is that those with a combination
of experience, skills, resources, power, and connections can and do affect the policy
choices made by government officials.14 Importantly, this literature emphasizes
that these actors do not have to be always unified and can have diverse characteristics. Moreover, those with influence do not possess it indefinitely, and often new
actors eventually enter the public policy space and seek to exert their influence on
the state.15
In terms of foreign actors specifically affecting the legal systems and legal professions of countries that are not indigenous to them, the literature is replete with
narratives. The impact of colonial rule is a paradigm that immediately springs to
mind. For example, the exporting of common law jurisprudence, along with the

13. See generally FLOYD HUNTER, COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF DECISION MAKERS
(1953) (describing how a small group of elites shape policy in a range of venues); CHARLES WRIGHT
MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956) (arguing that those with power in politics, business, and the military
prevent ordinary citizens from exercising meaningful influence in these spaces); ELMER ERIC
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
(1960) (discussing how a small group of people in the upper class segments of society inhibit the masses
from participating broadly); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITES
(1976) (focusing on the role of national politicians in a range of countries as being the main drivers in
the formulation of public policy).
14. HUNTER, supra note 13; MILLS, supra note 13; SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 13; PUTNAM, supra
note 13; see also ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (1962) (focusing on the oligopolistic nature of
political parties and trade unions); VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY: A TREATISE ON
GENERAL SOCIOLOGY (1963); GAETANO MOSCA, THE RULING CLASS (1966) (discussing the shifting
nature of power between conservatives who he classified as “lions” and radicals that he saw as “foxes”).
15. Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Towards a Historical Analysis of Elites in Latin America 25-26 (July
12-16, 2009) (Paper presented at the 21st World Congress of Political Science, Santiago, Chile),
http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/view/744; PARETO, supra note 14.
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training of solicitors and barristers who could then practice within the colonies, remains a significant legacy left by British imperialism. 16 Continental European rulers also imparted their respective civil codes (together with the structural roles lawyers and judges should play) within their colonies – whether in Latin America or
different parts of Africa and Asia.17
From the United States, several initiatives emerged throughout the 20th century.
As early as 1913, entrepreneurial American lawyers traveled to places such as Brazil to work not just as lawyers who would advise on U.S. law but also as domestic
practitioners.18 Dezalay and Garth note similar patterns of migration by American
lawyers in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico.19 Abel and Lewis, too, have documented
the journeys of U.S. lawyers abroad in various works, 20 as has Carole Silver who
discusses how in France when regulations were lax, Americans served as conseils
juridiques.21
In terms of non-governmental institutional influence, perhaps there is no more
important example than the American-based Ford Foundation’s efforts, beginning
in the 1950s. Through the hiring of mainly American and British lawyer-consultants, Ford advised governments in Latin America, South Asia, and Africa on how
16. See generally Samuel Schmitthenner, A Sketch of the Development of the Legal Profession in
India, 3 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 339 (1968-1969) (discussing the history of the profession during colonial
and then post-colonial times); Marc Galanter & V.S. Rehki, The Impending Transformation of the Indian
Legal Profession (1996) (unpublished paper) (on file with author) (discussing how legal practice in India
changed with liberalization and reforms in legal education); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, ASIAN
LEGAL REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE (2010) (describing how legal elites in the colonies of different European empires became leaders in the march for their respective national independence); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Globetrotting Law Firms, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 57 (2010) (outlining
how Indian law firms evolved over the past three centuries).
17. Richard Abel, Western Courts in Non-Western Settings: Patterns of Court Use in Colonial and
New-Colonial Africa, in THE IMPOSITION OF LAW 167-200 (Barbara E. Harrell-Bond & Sandra B. Burman eds., 1979); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS:
LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002) [hereinafter DEZALAY & GARTH, PALACE WARS]; M.C. MIROW: LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF
PRIVATE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA (2004); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Academic
SAILERS: The Ford Foundation and the Efforts to Shape Legal Education in Africa, 1957-1977, 52 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 261, 263 (2012) [hereinafter Krishnan, Academic SAILERS]; Joaquim Falcão, Lawyers
in Brazil, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 400 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis
eds., 1988); Frederico Almeida, A Nobreza Togada: As Elites Jurídicas e a Política da Justiça no Brasil,
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of São Paulo, Department of Political Science) (on file with
authors). During the 1800s, when many colonies gained independence from their European rulers, foreign influence continued, despite the absence of formal governmental rule. It was not uncommon for
students from Latin America to spend time in Continental Europe for schooling or for tutelage under
practicing lawyers. Similarly, following the Second World War, when many British and French colonies
became free, students from these newly independent states traveled to study law in places such as London
and Paris. Quintin Johnstone, American Assistance to African Legal Education, 46 TUL. L. REV. 657,
666 (1972); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford
Foundation, and the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 447 (2004) [hereinafter Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield].
18. Jayanth K. Krishnan et al., Legal Elites and the Shaping of Corporate Law Practice in Brazil: A
Historical Study, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 346 (2016) (noting how over the course of the next four
decades, these Americans established offices in Brazil, partnered with domestic Brazilians, and helped
to shape a Brazilian corporate bar with lasting remnants that are still seen today).
19. DEZALAY & GARTH, PALACE WARS, supra note 17.
20. RICHARD L. ABEL & PHILLIP S.C. LEWIS, LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD
(1988); Richard L. Abel & Phillip S.C. Lewis, Putting Law Back into the Sociology of Lawyers, in
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW 281 (Richard L. Abel & Phillip S.C. Lewis eds., 1995).
21. Carole Silver, Regulatory Mismatch in the International Market for Legal Services, 23 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 487, 531 (2003).
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to initiate changes in legal education, the courts, and the legal profession. 22 Ford’s
theory was that a society with good lawyers would be beneficial in multiple ways:
these professionals would ideally serve as leaders in key sectors such as business,
economics, civil society, and politics. In Latin America and South Asia, previous
scholarship has discussed the mixed results of Ford’s efforts. 23 Ford’s work in Africa, however, has the most direct relevance for this study on Dubai.
Early on, Ford’s astute Africa officers recognized that to influence the domestic
legal landscape, they needed buy-in from the local bar, bench, and educational establishments in the countries in which they worked. 24 Ford thus affirmatively decided to take its lead from these domestic legal professionals. The lawyer-consultants Ford hired worked together with their African colleagues in trying to improve
and develop the local legal systems.25 Even though not all the legal programs that
Ford established were successful during this time, 26 there was little resentment
among either the Americans or Africans, or a sense that the former were on the
continent for exploitative, instrumental purposes. 27
There are obvious political, socio-economic, and historical differences between
Africa and Dubai. Yet, parallels exist between how Ford ran its Africa project and
22. JOHN S. BAINBRIDGE, THE SAILER PROJECT: 1962-1967, FORD FOUNDATION DOCUMENT 7 (July
1967) (on file with author) (outlining the origins of sending new American law graduates to Africa to
teach in African law schools); David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development, WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974) (questioning the value of
projects where Americans travel overseas to assist in legal reform); JAMES GARDNER, LEGAL
IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980) (describing and then
criticizing efforts by American development organizations to improve law, legal education, and the legal
profession in Latin America); Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield, supra note 17, at 449-468; Krishnan, Academic SAILERS, supra note 17, at 267-313.
23. In India, for example, during the 1950s and 1960s, Ford hired a series of consultants from the
United States –mainly law professors – to provide input on how best to help the Indians improve their
legal education system. The theory was that engaging in this endeavor would have a causal effect towards enhancing the quality of lawyering and legal representation for the millions who were not having
their needs met. However, shortly after they arrived onto the scene, the American academics recognized
that they knew very little about the local context. They advised Ford to pay more attention to what the
actors on the ground were doing and to learn from these individuals as well. To its credit, as the years
went on Ford reorganized its legal profession and legal education programs, and the lessons learned
during this venture helped inform how it operated in other regions, such as Latin America. Krishnan,
Professor Kingsfield, supra note 17, at 449-468; Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Bread for the
Poor: Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789, 795-798 (2004);
Jayanth K. Krishnan et al., Grappling at the Grassroots: Access to Justice in India’s Lower Tier, 27
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 151, 154-157 (2014). Although, as it relates to Latin America, some years back, see
generally GARDNER, supra note 22 (arguing that Ford wrongly encouraged Latin American law students
and lawyers during the 1960s to be social welfare advocates and nation-builders, in the image of how
many U.S. lawyers in this same period were acting and contending that Ford’s imposing and imprudent
initiatives fomented anti-Americanism and contributed to the rise in non-democratic regimes in many of
these countries). However, Gardner’s analysis has been seriously criticized by Faundez, who argues that
Ford’s efforts, while having some drawbacks, were not as negative as Gardner suggested. Faundez also
contends that, like in India, Ford learned from its missteps. Julio Faundez, James A. Gardner: Legal
Imperialism. American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America, 14 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 206, 206208 (1982) (book review).
24. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22; JOHN S. BAINBRIDGE, STUDY AND TEACHING OF LAW IN AFRICA
(1972) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, AFRICA]; Krishnan, Academic SAILERS, supra note 17, at 278-313.
25. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22; BAINBRIDGE, AFRICA, supra note 24; Krishnan, Academic SAILERS,
supra note 17, at 278-313.
26. The time period being referred to here was from the late 1950s to the early 1970s.
27. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield, supra note 17, at 278-319 (identifying only a single instance of
resentment during the program).
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what has occurred in Dubai over the past seven years. As the financial woes of
Dubai World grew during 2009, experts from abroad who had sophisticated international skills and a deep knowledge of global insolvency practices came to Dubai
to help repair the economic damage that was placing the Emirate on the verge of
default.28
But this point requires another layer. Although they were invited, it was imperative for these external actors to establish strong bonds within various sectors of
the government. After all, the Emiratis were still in control of the state. They held
power, and Dubai’s Ruler was the one individual who had to approve any changes
to the Emirate’s legal structure. Furthermore, having good relationships with civil
society Emiratis was also crucial, because they had the everyday pulse of the private
sector. Thus, borrowing from a combination of Dezalay and Garth’s work and
Bourdieu’s terminology, the external actors in this Dubai narrative possessed valuable social capital. Yet, this resource could only be effectively deployed if key
local actors cooperated and were regarded as equal partners in the deliberations.29
Otherwise put, to find a solution to the Dubai World crisis, the external actors
needed to work together with their domestic counterparts. As the ensuing discussion illustrates, such a situation indeed occurred.

III.

THE HISTORY OF THE DUBAI WORLD COMPANY CRISIS
A.

Methodology

As indicated in the Introduction, the financial crisis of Dubai World reached its
peak at the end of 2009. However, cracks within the company’s financial situation
began to show earlier that year. This Section describes the events that led to the
near collapse of the company and what would have been a likely default of the
Dubai government to its various creditors had emergency measures not been taken.
Yet, before beginning this discussion, a brief explanation of how the authors acquired their information on this subject is needed.
During 2015, the authors were able to interview virtually all of the major stakeholders involved in Dubai’s financial crisis. 30 The respondents included those foreign lawyers who played a significant role in drafting the decree that established the
new legal regime for Dubai World’s insolvency situation, as well as those who have
litigated matters in the Dubai World Tribunal since. In addition, interviews were
conducted with those foreign business consultants and foreign accountants who advised the Dubai government during the crisis. Members of the Dubai World Tribunal also were interviewed, as was the Tribunal’s registrar, and a key Emirati government official agreed to meet with the authors as well. In sum, twelve foreign
28. See discussion infra Section III.C.
29. DEZALAY & GARTH, PALACE WARS, supra note 17, at 49 (for the Americans circulating into the
Brazilian market; and discussing the “coming together of [Brazilian] local know-who with U.S. local
know-how”); Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups, 14 THEORY & SOC’Y 723,
723 (1985); Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE
SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241 (John G. Richardson ed., 1986); See also DEZALAY & GARTH, supra
note 16, at 1-19; F.M. Kay & J. Hagan, Cultivating clients in the competition for partnership: Gender
and the organizational restructuring of law firms in the 1990s, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 517, 527 (1999).
30. For most of the interviews, the authors conducted these together. However, where noted below,
some took place where only one of the authors was present.
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lawyers, three of the Tribunal’s four judges, three business and financial advisors,
the Tribunal’s registrar, and an important figure from the Department of Finance all
participated in the interview process.31
Finally, to supplement the interview data, the authors also relied on two other
sources of information. First, business media reports, academic articles and books,
law firm and accounting firm publications, and governmental papers were studied.
Second, the authors analyzed all the published and available judgments rendered by
the Tribunal – a total of 82 decisions. The docket, of course, includes all of Dubai
World’s insolvency cases. But as will be seen shortly, surprisingly the clear majority of cases involve other unrelated matters, thereby illustrating an important expansion of the Tribunal’s powers.

B.

The Events of 2009 & Dubai World

Dubai World was founded as a “[g]lobal holding company” 32 by the Emirate’s
Ruler, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, in 2006. 33 Then, and to this
day, Dubai World’s “portfolio contains some of the world’s leading companies in
their industries, including Drydocks World, Economic Zones World, Istithmar
World and majority ownership of DP World.”34 As of this writing, its current head
is Sheikh Ahmed Bin Saeed Al Maktoum. 35 As stated above, Dubai World has
investments, multiple subsidiaries, and a workforce that spans the globe. 36
A great deal of Dubai World’s investments also has included real estate, which
during 2006 and 2007 appeared to be a wise venture. However, towards the latter
half of 2007 and in the years following, Dubai World suffered from the downslide
in the real estate market. Within the Emirate, there was a catastrophic “local property crash.”37 Consider that just between the third and fourth quarters in 2008 home
31. What is perhaps most intriguing about the respondents mentioned here is that their number appears
quite small. It is true that these individuals had many colleagues and subordinates who followed their
directions and worked diligently during this entire period. But the fact is that only a relatively tiny group
of thought-leaders and experts formulated and then implemented the macro-policy measures that
emerged at the end of 2009. Recall that during this time there was great anxiety and fear, but there
remained two clear objectives: to ensure that the Emirate did not default, and to address the monetary
and legal claims of global creditors against the debtor-Dubai World Corporation. Given the extreme
pressures of those final months of 2009, for logistical purposes alone, it is understandable why the government tasked a small, sophisticated group of experts to solve the crisis. Also, the authors came to know
that the individuals interviewed were among the key group of players in this story through a combination
of means, including employing referral sampling and snowball sampling methods. The first author,
through his prior work on the Dubai courts, knew the registrar of the DWT, Mark Beer, who was intimately involved in drafting the insolvency framework in 2009. Beer provided the names of others –
lawyers, judges, and Dubai government officials – who also were significantly involved. And then these
respondents provided names of others who they thought would be important to interview. Respondents
were also identified from business news media accounts, which named key officials in and outside of
government who were working on the new insolvency regime and its aftermath.
32. Dubai World, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/company/dubai-world (last visited Dec. 10,
2016); DUBAI WORLD, http://www.dubaiworld.ae/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
33. LINKEDIN, supra note 32; DUBAI WORLD, supra note 32.
34. LINKEDIN, supra note 32; DUBAI WORLD, supra note 32.
35. HH Sheikh Ahmed Bin Saeed Al Maktoum, DUBAI WORLD, http://www.dubaiworld.ae/hh-sheikhahmed/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).
36. See LINKED IN, supra note 32; DUBAI WORLD, supra note 32.
37. Tom Arnold & David French, Dubai World gets majority creditor backing $14.6 billion debt deal,
REUTERS (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/12/us-dubai-world-restructuringidUSKBN0KL0R520150112#RwDA1zkTqtUkXZfC.97.
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prices plummeted twenty-five percent, while “[h]igh-end apartments and villas
were the worst-hit, with prices falling [on average] 35% in Q4 . . . .”38 Perhaps the
most well-known of these elite complexes, the Palm Jumeirah properties (in which
Dubai World had invested), sank to nearly two-thirds of their peak value. 39
According to experts, the bursting of the real estate bubble in Dubai was predictable. In March 2006, Dubai passed a law that loosened restrictions on foreign
investors being able to purchase property within the Emirate. 40 Foreigners from
around the globe poured money into Dubai, leading to “[e]xcessive short-term speculative activity . . . .”41 The result was that investors were willing to pay top-price
for real estate. Many who successfully purchased property then subsequently leveraged these assets to make other investments. 42
Dubai World was among those who sought to benefit during these prosperous
times. It and its subsidiaries engaged a range of investments, property purchases,
and construction projects.43 However, once the global financial crisis hit in 2008,
foreign capital fled Dubai.44 By February 2009, roughly “half of all the construction
projects in the UAE [fifty-nine in total], worth around AED1.1 trillion (US$582
billion) . . . [were] either put on hold or cancelled in response to falling demand
and deteriorating market conditions.” 45 Table 1 illustrates those projects that were
among the largest adversely impacted by the financial crisis; three of these major
ones were part of Dubai World’s portfolio. (They are listed below as properties
held by Nakheel, a key subsidiary of Dubai World.)

38. UAE’s housing market crash, GLOB. PROP. GUIDE (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Middle-East/United-Arab-Emirates/Price-History-Archive/UAEs-housing-market-crash112.
39. See id.
40. See id.; See also New Law Encourages Foreign Ownership in Dubai Property Like Condo Hotels,
CONDO HOTELS DUBAI, http://www.condohotelsdubai.com/articles/foreign-ownership.htm (last visited
Dec. 20, 2016). See also The Foreign Ownership of Property in Dubai, LOUVRE GROUP (Apr. 3, 2013),
http://www.louvregroup.com/the-foreign-ownership-of-property-in-dubai/.
41. UAE’s housing market crash, supra note 38. See also New Law Encourages Foreign Ownership
in Dubai Property Like Condo Hotels, CONDO HOTELS DUBAI, http://www.condohotelsdubai.com/articles/foreign-ownership.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2016). See also The Foreign Ownership of Property
in Dubai, LOUVRE GROUP (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.louvregroup.com/the-foreign-ownership-of-property-in-dubai.
42. See UAE’s housing market crash, supra note 38. See also New Law Encourages Foreign Ownership in Dubai Property Like Condo Hotels, CONDO HOTELS DUBAI, http://www.condohotelsdubai.com/articles/foreign-ownership.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2016). See also The Foreign Ownership of Property in Dubai, LOUVRE GROUP (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.louvregroup.com/the-foreignownership-of-property-in-dubai.
43. For a history of Dubai World’s activities on this point, see DUBAI WORLD, www.dubaiworld.ae.
44. UAE’s housing market crash, supra note 38.
45. Id.
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Table 146
PROJECT

LOCATION

DEVELOPER

VALUE
(US$)

STATUS

Jumeirah Gardens City

Satwa district,
Dubai

Meraas Development

95 billion

On hold

Mohamed Bin
Rashed Gardens

Between Al
Khail Road
and Emirates
Road, Dubai

Dubai Properties

55 billion

On hold

Nakheel Harbour & Tower

Between
Phase 2 of Ibn
Battuta shopping mall and
the 75-km
Arabian Canal,
Dubai

Nakheel

38 billion

On hold

Mudon Development

Dubailand

Dubai Properties

21 billion

On hold

Culture Village

Along Dubai
Creek,
next to Garhoud Bridge

Dubai Properties

13.6 billion

On hold

Palm Deira

Deirah coastal
area, Dubai

Nakheel

12.5 billion

On hold

Al Salam City

City of Umm
Al Quwain

Tameer Holding

8.3 billion

On hold

Al Burj Tower
(The Tall
Tower)

Near Jumeirah
Lake
Towers and
Dubai Marina

Nakheel

8.2 billion

On hold

Universal City

Dubailand

Dubailand

2.2 billion

On hold

Emerald Gateway

Along Coast
Road, between
Abu Dhabi
downtown and
Abu Dhabi International
Airport

Abu Dhabi
Municipality

1.9 billion

On hold

46. UAE’s housing market crash, supra note 38.
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Aqua Dunya

Dubailand

Dubailand

1.8 billion

On hold

Dolphin City

Island near
Abu Dhabi

Emirates German Group

1.7 billion

On hold

Nad El Sheba
Race course

5-km southeast of Dubai

Meydan LLC

1.3 billion

Cancelled

Al Falah

Outskirts of
Abu Dhabi

Aldar Properties

0.72 billion

On hold

Falcon City
of Wonders

Dubailand

ETA Star

0.68 billion

Cancelled

Dubai
Exhibition
City

Within the
Jebel Ali Airport City

n/a

0.45 billion

Cancelled

As Table 1 indicates, Dubai’s finances were clearly in trouble. In fact, during
February 2009, the U.A.E. Central Bank loaned $20 billion to government-related
entities of Dubai (including Dubai World) to meet their debt payment obligations. 47
But the problems for Dubai World continued to mount during that summer and into
the fall. By late 2009, the Dubai government had accumulated $80 billion in debt,
of which 60 billion belonged to Dubai World.48 On November 25, the government’s
Department of Finance declared, to the astonishment of many in the international
markets, that Dubai World would be seeking a “standstill”49 on any further payments to its creditors. Various observers referred to this decision as a “disaster,” 50
“shocking,”51 and “the biggest sovereign-related credit event since the start of the
[2008 global economic] crisis.”52
It is unclear whether the government anticipated such a fierce response. Regardless, it had already been working on plans to reorganize the Emirate’s insolvency regime precisely to calm the worries of Dubai World’s global creditors. The
developments that occurred are examined next.

47. The financial aid package, specifically, was in the form of bond relief. The Dubai government
issued 20 billion dollars in bonds for its government related entities, of which Dubai World was a part,
and whereby the U.A.E. Central Bank purchased half of the issued bonds, with two Abu Dhabi banks
buying one-fourth, and the Abu Dhabi government buying the remaining amount. For a discussion of
this point, see OXFORD BUSINESS GROUP, THE REPORT: ABU DHABI 2010, at 42 (2010).
48. See James Drummond & Andrew England, Dubai World asks for debt ‘standstill’, FIN. TIMES
(Nov.
25,
2009),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8a7a78e6-d9b9-11de-ad9400144feabdc0.html#axzz3rCfrfTM2. See also Smith & Kiwan, supra note 4.
49. David Teather, Dubai World seeks debt standstill, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2009),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2009/nov/25/dubai-world-debt-standstill; Drummond & England, supra note 48.
50. Drummond & England, supra note 48.
51. Teather, supra note 49.
52. Id.
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The Lead-Up to Reform and Decree 57

In 2004, the government opened the Dubai International Financial Centre
(DIFC). Previous research has examined the DIFC and its purpose and framework,53 but briefly, the Centre serves as the Emirate’s main zone for international
business.54 The DIFC is a multi-acre campus that houses firms from a diverse array
of sectors from around the globe.55 Established under Dubai Law No. 9, the DIFC
was created in order to make Dubai one of the leading commercial capitals in the
world.56 In addition, the DIFC has the authority to oversee matters involving business law, property law, and employment law. 57 There is a set of English-speaking
common law courts that adjudicates matters not just between parties located within
the campus but also between competing parties (within or outside of the Emirate),
so long as they give consent.58
In February 2009, as Dubai World and its subsidiaries were witnessing the beginnings of their financial woes, the prestigious American law firm of Latham &
Watkins hosted a meeting on insolvency and restructuring practices. 59 The seminar
brought experts from around the globe to the DIFC, including bankers, financial
analysts, and members of the international press. 60 The European High Yield Bond
Association, CNBC, and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
also were sponsors of the conference, and members of the Dubai government participated as well.61
After the conference concluded, these Dubai officials briefed a group of these
experts on the serious financial situation that the government and Dubai World were
facing.62 Specifically, one of the latter’s key subsidiaries, Nakheel PJSC, was having difficulty fulfilling its obligations to a sukuk that it had issued to its creditors.
Islamic law traditionally forbids “the charging or payment of interest.” 63 While a
sukuk is effectively a bond, it adheres to Islamic law, because it “grants the investor
a share of an asset, along with the commensurate cash flows and risk.” 64 Sukuks

53. Jayanth K. Krishnan & Priya Purohit, A Common Law Court in an Uncommon Environment: The
DIFC Judiciary and Global Commercial Dispute Resolution, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 497, 497-98
(2014).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, Middle East Offices Managing Partner, Latham &
Watkins (Oct. 19, 2015).
60. Id. See also telephone interview with Aaron Bielenberg, former Latham & Watkins associate
(Dec. 7, 2015). See also Program Agenda for the Middle East Restructuring and Turnaround Conference, (Feb. 3, 2009) (on file with authors).
61. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59; Telephone interview with Aaron
Bielenberg, supra note 60. See Program Agenda, supra note 60.
62. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59; Telephone interview with Aaron
Bielenberg, supra note 60.
63. What is Sukuk?, ISLAMIC DEV. BANK, http://thatswhy.isdb.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelopments/Internet/thatswhy/en/sukuk/what-is-sukuk.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).
64. Id.
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have been generously issued by companies and sovereign governments in the Middle East and Asia; and Dubai World, its subsidiaries, and the Emirate itself have
followed suit.65
Nakheel, unfortunately, could not afford to pay off a $4 billion sukuk that was
about to be due at the end of 2009.66 Some weeks earlier, the government of Dubai
contacted Latham to ask for help.67 Latham had recently established offices in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, and it had lawyers there with extensive regional familiarity. 68
The American firm suggested that the Dubai government also call upon the acclaimed New York-based investment bank, Moelis & Company. 69 Together, Latham and Moelis began working towards a plan that would assist the Emirate, Dubai
World, and Nakheel address the economic crisis in which they found themselves. 70
Almost immediately, Latham wanted to convince the outstanding creditors to
restructure and extend the maturity of the debts.71 It advised the government to
request a reduction in the interest rates on existing loans and to amend and extend
the payment schedule on the debts to a timetable that would be easier to meet. 72 In
addition, an announcement from the Dubai government was released in November
2009, highlighting its economic woes and how it was considering defaulting on its
debt obligations.73 Latham recommended this move for two reasons. First, such a
public proclamation signaled a transparency to the markets that the Emirate understood the seriousness of its financial situation. 74 Second, with the government stating that all options were on the table, including defaulting, the world would be
placed on notice of this predicament and might even consider providing financial
support to the Emirate. 75 Otherwise put, by openly acknowledging the problems it
was enduring, Dubai sought to harness support from those willing to extend additional credit to the government as well as from existing creditors themselves. 76

65. See id.; See Bernardo Vizcaino, As sovereign issues grow, pricing and design stymie corporate
sukuk, REUTERS (May 29, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/29/sukuk-companiesidUSL5N0YJ0O720150529#lt6wk7JECiXuga0E.97; Frank Kane, Dubai now leading hub for sukuk
trading, THE NAT’L (July 8, 2015), http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/dubai-now-leadinghub-for-sukuk-trading. Also, telephone interview with Augusto Sasso, New York Managing Partner,
Moelis & Company (Dec. 16, 2015).
66. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; See Frank Kane, Dubai debt adviser Moelis will list on Wall Street, THE NAT’L (Apr. 15,
2014), http://www.thenational.ae/business/industry-insights/markets/dubai-debt-adviser-moelis-willlist-on-wall-street; see also Markets take little comfort in Dubai World’s plan to restructure $26B in
debt, DAILY NEWS (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/markets-comfort-dubaiworld-plan-restructure-26b-debt-article-1.432933.
70. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. IMF, United Arab Emirates: 2009 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; Public Information Notice; and Statement by the Executive Director for the United Arab Emirates, Country Report No. 10/42,
at 11-12 (Feb. 2010).
74. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59.
75. Id.
76. Id.; See Once high-flying Dubai World now meeting with creditor panel to deal with debt crisis,
DAILY NEWS (Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/high-flying-dubai-world-meeting-creditor-panel-deal-debt-crisis-article-1.432956; See also Meeting of creditors is next test for Dubai
World, THE NAT’L (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/meeting-of-creditorsis-next-test-for-dubai-world.
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The strategy worked. Following the release of the press announcement, the
Central Bank of the U.A.E. called a meeting where government officials from Dubai
and Abu Dhabi, among others, were present.77 At this meeting, the Abu Dhabi
government agreed to provide a $20 billion aid package to Dubai.78 This assistance
allowed Nakheel to pay-off the sukuk – due to mature in December 2009 — as well
as some of Dubai World’s other debts.79 Yet, Dubai World still had additional debt
and thus was not completely absolved. Consequently, it and the Dubai government,
through their American law firm, Latham, began the process of restructuring and
negotiating an extension of the maturity dates of the other outstanding loans 80 (these
other loans were to come due in 2009, or the following year; Latham successfully
renegotiated their terms out to 2013).81
Abu Dhabi’s financial assistance alleviated Dubai’s immediate trouble, mainly
as it related to those payments due in December 2009. Given Dubai World’s overall
financial condition, though, the company’s staff, the government, and its external
advisors all recognized there had to be systematic change to the Emirate’s insolvency process, including the need to draft an entirely new legal regime to govern
future debtor-creditor disputes surrounding Dubai World.82 Remarkably, on December 13, 2009, a landmark order, written effectively by the government’s external advisors, was signed into law by Dubai’s Ruler, forever transforming the insolvency procedures to be applied to the Emirate’s largest multi-national conglomerate, Dubai World.83

D.

Decree 57

Dubai World Corporation was created as a “decree corporation” that came into
existence through a mandate issued by the Emirate’s Ruler.84 Because of this status,
and the fact that it did not follow the country’s regular process for incorporation,
Dubai World was unable to seek protection from the U.A.E.’s federal laws. 85 In
fact, the external experts, together with the government’s officials, all believed that
even if Dubai World could fall with the traditional insolvency regulations, it still
would be unwise to do so because of the complexity of the financial crisis facing
the corporation.86 Experts needed to devise a new code. Enter Decree 57.
77. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59. See also Telephone Interview with
Augusto Sasso, supra note 65.
78. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59. See also Telephone Interview with
Augusto Sasso, supra note 65. See Dana El Baltaji, Dubai Sukuk, Abu Dhabi TDIC Spread Narrows to
Lowest Since 2009, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201103-31/dubai-sukuk-abu-dhabi-tdic-spread-narrows-to-lowest-since-2009.
79. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59; See also El Baltaii, supra note 78.
80. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59; See also El Baltaii, supra note 78.
81. Telephone interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59.
82. Id.; Interview with Mark Beer, Registrar, DIFC Courts & DWT, in Dubai, U.A.E. (Sept. 2, 2015).
83. Latham & Watkins, New Dubai Decree Relating to any Future Restructuring of Dubai World and
its Subsidiaries, CLIENT ALERT, Jan. 8, 2010, at 1. See also Telephone Interview with Augusto Sasso,
supra note 65.
84. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 1. See also Hall et al., supra note 3, at 27. See also Telephone
Interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65.
85. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 1. See also Hall et al., supra note 3, at 27. See also Telephone
Interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65.
86. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 4. See also Hall et al., supra note 3, at 27. See also Telephone
Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59; Interview with Mark Beer, supra note 82; Telephone
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In crafting Decree 57’s insolvency system, both the external experts and local
Dubai officials agreed that the best course of action would be to build upon the laws
already in place that governed companies within the DIFC. 87 But there was sentiment that additional aspects of English and American insolvency laws had to be
included as well.88 While there was overlap between the two, there was debate as
to which model ought to be primarily followed.
English law heavily influenced the DIFC’s insolvency regime; but the American experts did not believe that English law adequately protected debtor companies,
such as Dubai World.89 In particular, they felt that the rules under the English system for accessing moratorium protection from creditors were too harsh. 90 The
American experts believed, and ultimately persuaded the Dubai government, that it
was better policy to have a “voluntary arrangement process,” 91 (VAP), whereby Dubai World would “continue to manage its affairs . . . and, with . . . [more easily
accessible] protection of a moratorium, pursue and, if approved, implement a restructuring.”92 Under this VAP system, which drew upon Chapter 11 of the American Bankruptcy Code, the corporation could propose a plan to restructure its debt
obligations. So long as two-thirds “in value . . . of any class of creditors” 93 approved, all creditors would be bound.94
The framers added another important feature to Decree 57, allowing for a fiduciary “to represent the company in foreign insolvency proceedings.” 95 In practice,
the process would work in the following manner: Dubai World would receive an
order from a local court in Dubai approving of a moratorium on a set of creditors’
claims; then the representative would take this order to the U.S.; finally, because of
the presence of Chapter 15 in the American Bankruptcy Code,96 there would be a
Interview with Aaron Bielenberg, supra note 60. See also Telephone Interview with Augusto Sasso,
supra note 65.
87. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 4; Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note
59.
88. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 1; Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note
59.
89. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 1-2; Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note
59.
90. Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59.
91. See Decree No. 57 of 2009 Establishing a Tribunal to decide the Disputes Related to the Settlement
of the Financial Position of Dubai World and its Subsidiaries, § 2, arts. 9-16 (U.A.E.) [hereinafter Decree
No. 57]; Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 1-2.
92. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 1; Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note
59.
93. Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 4.
94. Note, under the English system the ability to ‘cram down’ such a plan upon dissenting creditors
was much more difficult, and a key reason the Americans saw the U.K. insolvency regime as unfriendly
to debtors. See Decree No. 57, supra note 91, § 2, art. 14; Latham & Watkins, supra note 83, at 4;
Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59; Telephone Interview with Aaron Bielenberg,
supra note 60; Telephone Interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65.
95. LINKLATERS, BRIEFING NOTE: DUBAI WORLD RESTRUCTURING DECREE NO. 57 OF 2009 4 (Dec.
2009), http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/Insights/DubaiWorldRestructuringDecree.pdf.
96. Chapter 15 was added to the Bankruptcy Code by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005. Its purpose is to provide procedures for insolvency cases between parties in more
than one country. Chapter 15 cases are generally brought in the U.S. after a primary proceeding is
brought in another country. See Chapter 15 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-15-bankruptcy-basics
(last visited Dec. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Basics]. See also Chapter 15 Database of U.S. Crossborder Cases, GLOB. INSOLVENCY, http://globalinsolvency.com/chapter15 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016)
[hereinafter Database of U.S. Cross-border Cases].
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strong presumption for enforcing the Dubai order within the U.S. courts. 97 Assuming enforcement occurred, creditors would be blocked from seizing the assets of
Dubai World’s (many) U.S. holdings. 98 Moreover, other potential creditors would
be hard-pressed to defy such an American judgment, because of the respect U.S.
courts hold in the area of insolvency. In other words, these creditors would likely
refrain from challenging this order in the U.S. or from trying to seize assets of Dubai
World in another jurisdiction, where a court there would no-doubt examine what its
U.S. counterpart had done.99
Of course, this above discussion is premised on Dubai World first receiving an
order from a local Dubai court. However, the question for Decree 57’s framers was:
which local courts should govern? As already mentioned, because U.A.E. insolvency law would not apply, the domestic Arabic language courts could not have
jurisdiction. Both the external advisors and Dubai government officials decided
that a new court needed to be created to address the issues tied specifically to the
corporation. Decree 57 thus established the Dubai World Tribunal (DWT), which
was proposed to be located within the DIFC, although organizationally it was to be
separate from the DIFC Courts.
Overlap between the two, however, was inevitable. Initially, Decree 57 provided that the DWT was to have three members, with all of the judges coming directly from the DIFC Courts: Sir Anthony Evans, Michael Hwang, and Sir John
Chadwick.100 Each of these judges was distinguished and respected. Each also had
international commercial experience and great familiarity with the Dubai landscape.101 Understandably then, the external and Emirati drafters wanted to have
these three judges on the DWT. In addition, the framers knew that time was of the
essence, and, because the logistics were simple, 102 it made sense to ask them to
serve.

97. See Bankruptcy Basics, supra note 96; Database of U.S. Cross-border Cases, supra note 96. Telephone Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59.
98. See Pedro A. Jimenez & Mark G. Douglas, Chapter 15 Recognition Mandatory and Fully Encumbered Assets Are ‘Property of the Debtor’ Protected by Automatic Stay, JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS
Nov./Dec. 2013), http://www.jonesday.com/chapter-15-recognition-mandatory-and-fully-encumberedassets-are-property-of-the-debtor-protected-by-automatic-stay-11-30-2013/. See also Bruce Nathan &
Eric Horn, Demystifying Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, BUS. CREDIT, June 2009, at 1; Telephone
Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59.
99. See Mark G. Douglas, Cross-Border Bankruptcy Battleground: The Importance of Comity (Part
I), JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS (Mar./Apr. 2010), http://www.jonesday.com/cross-border-bankruptcybattleground-the-importance-of-comity-part-i-03-31-2010/. See Nathan & Horn, supra note 98, at 1. Interview with Bryant Edwards, supra note 59.
100. Decree No. 57, supra note 91, art. 2. About the Tribunal: Tribunal Members, DUBAI WORLD
TRIBUNAL, http://dubaiworldtribunal.ae/about-the-tribunal/members/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
101. See About the Tribunal: Tribunal Members, supra note 100.
102. The DWT was able to use the world-class administrative facilities of the DIFC Courts, which
enabled it to come into existence (and accept cases 24 hours a day, seven days a week) only three weeks
after it was statutorily drafted.
Email from Mark Beer, DWT Registrar, to Jayanth K. Krishnan (June 17, 2016) (on file with author).
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THE FUNCTIONING OF THE DWT

A.

Jurisdiction and Composition

Decree 57 set forth the vast powers of the DWT. For example, the DWT would
have sole jurisdiction to hear “any demand or claim submitted by or against the
Corporation.”103 A judgment by the DWT would be final and binding, with no
appeal possible,104 and the cases within the DWT’s ambit would involve “any and
all claims brought against Dubai World and its subsidiaries.” 105 Primarily, the DWT
would be in charge of adjudicating and approving the voluntary arrangements on
the restructuring of Dubai World’s debt, while taking into account the procedural
and substantive interests of the corporation and the creditors.106 As Dubai’s Director General of its Legal Affairs Department, Dr. Lowai Belhoul, declared, “Decree
[57] establishes a clear, transparent and effective legal framework incorporating international best practices in restructuring.”107
In 2013, the DWT brought another DIFC Court’s judge, Sir David Steel, on to
the panel.108 Now, several years have passed since the DWT came into existence.
What has it done; how has it fared; and, most significantly, has it served its purpose?
Interestingly, while important insolvency and restructuring matters have indeed
come before it, those are relatively small in number compared to the explosion of
other types of cases that have emerged, which neither the framers nor initial set of
DWT judges originally anticipated.

B.

The Insolvency Cases

Only two major insolvency cases have presented themselves to the DWT, although the role of the Tribunal in each has been different. The more complicated
case involved “the largest [shipyard and shipbuilding] facility in the Middle

103. Decree No. (11) of 2010 Amending Decree No. (57) of 2009 Establishing a Tribunal to Decide the
Disputes Related to the Settlement of the Financial Position of Dubai World and its Subsidiaries, DUBAI
WORLD TRIBUNAL (Apr. 27, 2010), http://dubaiworldtribunal.ae/decree-no-11-of-2010-amending-decree-no-57-of-2009-esta-blishing-a-tribunal-to-decide-the-disputes-related-to-the-settlemen-t-of-the-financial-position-of-dubai-world-and-its-subsidiaries/ (amending Decree No. 57 to include claims
brought by Dubai World. Note the original Decree 57 only said that claims could be made “against the
Corporation.” See Decree No. 57, supra note 91, § 2, art. 24.
104. See Decree No. 57, supra note 91, art. 5.
105. Email from Mark Beer, supra note 102. Beer also noted that: “A later amendment to Decree 57
extended it further to all claims brought by or against Dubai World and its subsidiaries.” Id. See Decree
No. 57, supra note 91, art. 3(1)(a). See Decree No. (11), supra note 103.
106. See Decree No. 57, supra note 91, § 2, arts. 9-24.
107. LINKLATERS, supra note 95, at 9.
108. Sir Anthony Evans appointed Sir David Steel to this position, per the amending Decree of 2011,
but effectively the appointment of the panel of DWT judges is subject to the will of the Ruler. See Decree
No. 57, supra note 91, art. 2.
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East,”109 Drydocks World, which is among the most prominent subsidiaries of Dubai World. In business for more than thirty years, Drydocks has a global presence,
and, historically, has been as a leader in the shipping industry.110
During the late summer of 2011, however, Drydocks experienced a series of
financial difficulties. Namely, in August of that year, it decided that it could not
meet its payment obligations on a $2 billion plus loan it had secured in 2008. 111
Drydocks had intended to use the loan, “involving 15 lenders,” 112 to expand its investments in Singapore and other parts of Southeast Asia. 113 Yet three years later,
it concluded that it did not have the means to service this debt.114 As a result,
Drydocks began talks with its creditors on restructuring possibilities.
For the most part, these negotiations proceeded amicably. But in the fall of
2011, one creditor – Monarch Alternative Capital, a New York-based hedge fund115
– argued against the restructuring. Monarch had purchased a portion of Drydock’s
obligations (in the amount of $45.5 million116), and subsequently filed suit in a London High Court seeking payment in full. 117 In February 2012, Monarch received a

109. About Us: Profile, DRYDOCKS WORLD, http://www.drydocks.gov.ae/en/portal/profile.aspx (last
visited Dec. 3, 2016); See also John Everington, Drydocks World a positive test case for UAE bankruptcy
reform, THE NAT’L (May 19, 2014), http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/drydocks-world-apositive-test-case-for-uae-bankruptcy-reform.
110. See, e.g., Drydocks World Receives Prestigious Business Award, OFFSHORE ENERGY TODAY
(Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/drydocks-world-receives-prestigious-businessaward/; See also Another Honour for Drydocks World, ARABIAN INDUSTRY(Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.arabianindustry.com/supply-chain/news/2014/sep/29/another-honour-for-drydocks-world4830241/.
111. See Everington, supra note 109. See also Simeon Kerr, Dubai Drydocks looks to debt tribunal,
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2012), https://www.ft.com/content/e9fe6d26-7bf2-11e1-9100-00144feab49a; Simeon Kerr, Dubai Drydocks takes $2.2bn debt to tribunal, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2012),
https://www.ft.com/content/11f91f2e-7c89-11e1-8a27-00144feab49a. Note, the specifics of the loan
were that “Drydocks World borrowed . . . $1.7 billion for three years at 170 basis points, or 1.7 percentage points, over the London interbank offered rate, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. It borrowed another $500 million for five years at 190 basis points over Libor, the data shows.” Arif Sharif,
HSBC, BNP Said to Agree on Profit-Sharing Loan for Drydocks, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 4, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-03/drydocks-said-to-pay-part-of-2-25-billion-loanover-15-years.
112. Drydocks World in talks to restructure $1.7bn debt, CONSTR. WEEK ONLINE (June 1, 2010),
http://www.constructionweekonline.com/article-8497-drydocks-world-in-talks-to-restructure-17bndebt/.
113. See Dubai’s Drydocks World pins hopes on Asia, THE GULF (Jan. 2012),
http://www.thegulfonline.com/articles.aspx?artid=4218; Arif Sharif & Stefania Bianchi, Dyrdocks
World Seeks 5-Year Loan Plan in Debt Restructuring, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 8, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-08/drydocks-world-seeks-5-year-loan-plan-in-debtrestructuring-1-; Everington, supra note 109.
114. CONSTR. WEEK ONLINE, supra note 112.
115. See Everington, supra note 109; Praveen Menon & Dinesh Nair, Threats seen to Dubai World unit
$2.2 bln debt deal, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/dubaiworld-drydocksidUSL5E7MR0AB20111127.
116. See Everington, supra note 109; John Everington, Drydocks World restructuring talks unlikely to
be impacted by Monarch lawsuit, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/332e0ea420c5-11e1-816d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3yyTfFXpv [hereinafter Everington, FIN. TIMES] .
117. Monarch filed this case in the U.K. because English law is thought to be more advantageous for
creditors. The High Court had jurisdiction because Drydocks had holdings and assets in the U.K. Monarch Master Funding Ltd. v. Drydocks World – Dubai LLC, Drydocks World – Southeast Asia PTE
Limited, and Drydocks World LLC [2012] EWHC (QB) (Comm) (Eng.). See Everington, FIN. TIMES,
supra note 116; THE ASS’N OF INT’L CREDIT & TRADE FIN. PROF’LS, Insolvency Laws in Germany, U.K.
and the U.S.: A comparative Law Analysis for Trade Creditors, SHUMAKER, LOOP & KENDRICK (2013),
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judgment from the London court finding in its favor, ordering Drydocks to pay back
the $45.5 million, in addition to all legal fees.118
The ruling was a major setback for Drydocks. There was concern that some of
its other creditors might be inspired by Monarch’s actions and attempt to opt out of
the joint agreement and instead pursue individual claims in a similar fashion. 119 On
April 1, 2012, though, Drydocks took a “landmark decision . . . to file for a company
voluntary arrangement [italics added] (CVA) in the Dubai World Tribunal, using
the legal framework [Decree 57] put in place in December 2009.”120 Recall that
such a measure, if approved by the DWT, would allow Drydocks to move forward
on the deal it had struck with the vast majority of its creditors, and importantly,
“bind [any] holdout[s]”121 to the agreement, such as Monarch, as well.
Drydocks hired the well-regarded English barrister, Michael Crystal, to argue
its case.122 According to Crystal, Monarch was ironically a beneficiary of the CVA.
This agreement had set forth a partial payment schedule for Drydocks to make to
its various creditors, including to Monarch. 123 Because the CVA was authorized
under Decree 57 and fell within the DWT’s jurisdiction, 124 Crystal contended that
Monarch was estopped from now claiming that the decree’s provisions did not apply to it. Moreover, Monarch’s failure even to appear at the DWT to defend itself
during oral arguments demonstrated contempt for the Tribunal and for a process
from which it had clearly benefitted. 125
Ultimately, on August 28, 2012, the DWT formally approved Drydock’s petition, thereby mandating that Monarch accept the restructuring arrangement made
with 97.8% of creditors. Using the ‘cram-down’ method of securing compliance,126
the DWT sided with Drydocks and went on to reject Monarch’s counter-claim that
the payments it received via the CVA were meant only to satisfy the English High

http://www.slk-law.com/portalresource/DHC.Comparative%20Analysis%20of%20Insolvency%20Laws%20of%20US-UK-Germany.
118. See Monarch Master Funding Ltd. v. Drydocks World – Dubai LLC. . See Praveen Menon, U.S.
hedge fund wins claim against Dubai’s Drydocks, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-drydocks-monarch-idUSBRE82D0P220120314.
119. See also Simeon Kerr & Camilla Hall, Dubai Drydocks protected in landmark case, FIN. TIMES
(Sept.
3,
2012),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e6a4dbf8-f5bc-11e1-bf7600144feabdc0.html#axzz3ykDGBjiP (regarding the agreement negotiations, “Monarch declined to vote
. . . .”).
120. Everington, supra note 109.
121. Id.
122. See Michael Crystal et al., Thwarting dissenting creditors, SOUTH SQUARE DIGEST, Nov. 2013, at
2-7, http://www.southsquare.com/files/South-Square-Digest-November2013.pdf; Frank Kane, hedge
fund’s pursuit of Drydocks offers test case for Dubai, THE NAT’L (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.thenational.ae/business/industry-insights/finance/hedge-funds-pursuit-of-drydocks-offers-test-case-for-dubai
(Note that the date on this article is April 25, 2013, but it should be 2012.).
123. See Kane, supra note 122; Michael Crystal et al., supra note 122, at 2-7.
124. See Kane, supra note 122; Michael Crystal et al., supra note 122, at 2-7. See also Monarch
Master Funding Ltd. v. Drydocks World – Dubai LLC (DWT/VAN/0001/2012 – Reasons for Judgment)
(July 15, 2013) [hereinafter Reasons for Judgment).
125. See Kane, supra note 122(quoting Sir Anthony Evans).
126. Where, as discussed above, dissenting creditors are forced to adhere to the pact, so long as 75%
or more of the creditors agree to a restructuring of the debt. See Chris Mallon, Voting and cram-down,
in LEXIS PSL RESTRUCTURING & INSOLVENCY (June 2012), https://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/lexispsl/restructuringandinsolvency/document/393783/55MK-MBW1-F18D-T0DS-0000000/Schemes_of_arrangement_voting_and_cram_down; Decree No. 57, supra note 91, § 2, art. 14. See
also Interview with Ian Schneider, Price Waterhouse Coopers, in London, U.K. (Sept. 8, 2015).
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Court ruling.127 Rather, the DWT held that it had jurisdiction over Monarch and
needed to protect the interests of the other creditors, which could only best be done
by affirming the CVA and enjoining Monarch from further interference. 128 As Sir
Anthony Evans wrote in his opinion, using “Decree 57 [in this manner] was a bold
and imaginative step forward in the restructuring of the finances of Dubai.” 129 Soon
thereafter, Drydocks and Monarch reached a settlement. Subsequently, although
the specifics were not made public, one report from that time stated that Drydocks
did eventually restructure its debts by taking out “a new loan of about between
$700m and $800m to be repaid over five years, with another $1.4bn to $1.5bn being
offered in 15-year ‘profit participation notes’ that could see debt transferred into
equity after 10 years.”130
Preceding Drydocks was another matter that involved Dubai World itself. This
Dubai World restructuring was a massive, complicated project. Within Dubai
World, there were more than 180 entities and several dozen different creditors. 131
Recall from above, in late 2009 Dubai World notified its creditors that it did not
have enough money on-hand to meet its debt obligations (approx. $60 billion). Because the credit market was all but frozen, Dubai World had no way to access further capital.132 At the same time, many of these creditors wanted Dubai World to
sell off assets immediately so that they could be paid. But had such a move occurred, analysts contend that these creditors would have only received 45 cents on
the dollar on such sales.133 Therefore, the crafting and subsequent invocation of
Decree 57, these analysts suggest, while working to the obvious immediate benefit
of Dubai World, also helped preserve asset-value for creditors—even if the latter
did not recognize it. By facilitating a long-term restructuring that would lead to a
renewed, healthy Dubai World, creditors would eventually be able to recover more
than the projected 45 cents on the dollar (if not full value) for the loans they had
made.134 It would just take time, patience, and vision.
Following Dubai World’s announcement at the end of 2009 that it would suspend any further payments on its debt, the next several months involved highly intense negotiations between the conglomerate and its many creditors. By the fall of
2010, Dubai World had received approval on the restructuring of its immediate debt
obligations, totaling $25 billion, from nearly all its creditors.135 There was just one

127. See Reasons for Judgement, supra note 124; see also Michael Crystal et al., supra note 122, at 7.
128. See Reasons for Judgement, supra note 124; see also Michael Crystal et al., supra note 122, at 7.
129. See Kerr & Hall, supra note 119.
130. Id.
131. Telephone interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65; see also Robin Wigglesworth, US creditor
snubs
deal
on
Dubai
World
debt,
FIN.
TIMES
(Sept.
13,
2010),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/14fd5dfc-bea8-11df-a755-00144feab49a.
132. Telephone interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65.
133. Id. See also Paul Tharp, Dubai debt rescue sends stocks higher, N.Y. POST (Dec. 11, 2009),
http://nypost.com/2009/12/11/dubai-debt-rescue-sends-stocks-higher/; Dubai debt concerns spread beyond Dubai World, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-dubaiidUSTRE5B82FI20091209.
134. Telephone interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65.
135. Telephone interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65. See also Wigglesworth, supra note 131;
Dubai World gets creditors’ nod for debt restructuring plan, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Sept. 10, 2010),
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/international-business/Dubai-World-gets-creditors-nodfor-debt-restructuring-plan/articleshow/6531095.cms. Note that of this amount, “$14.4bn [was] owed
to financial creditors, [and] $10bn [was] owed to the Dubai government . . . .” Anousha Sakoui, Dubai
World
secures
$25bn
restructuring,
FIN.
TIMES
(Oct.
26,
2010),
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hold-up. An American fund, Aurelius Capital Management, refused to approve the
restructuring.136 Aurelius held $5 million of Dubai World’s debt and sought repayment within the original timeline. Dubai World, of course, had the option of going
to the DWT and seeking a cram-down enforcement measure against Aurelius, but
because the Tribunal had not yet been used in such a manner, it was unclear as to
how long this process would take.
Fortunately, for all parties involved, one of the creditors, Deutsche Bank came
to the rescue. In June of 2010, Deutsche Bank had sold some of the debt it held in
Dubai World “to several distressed debt funds, one of which was Aurelius.” 137
While almost all of the creditors had approved the restructuring plan for Dubai
World, as stated, one did not – Aurelius.138 Subsequently, Deutsche Bank intervened, repurchased the debt back from Aurelius, and then gave its approval to the
restructuring proposal.139 By October 2010, with all the creditors on board, a restructuring deal was reached.140 The particulars included a two-part scheme, with
the first major repayment occurring in 2015, followed by another in 2018. 141
In January 2015, Dubai World sought further restructuring of the 2018 payments to extend out until 2022.142 Unlike what occurred in 2010, Dubai World
approached the DWT for assistance and invoked Decree 57, because while the twothirds creditor-acceptance requirement had been met, it was unclear if unanimity
would be achieved. For Dubai World, it was important to be ready to litigate a

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a5ddfd68-e135-11df-90b7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz41TSenjHh. Perhaps the most well-known was a “$4 billion sukuk, or Islamic bond, of Dubai World’s developer,
Nakheel, which was especially known for the construction of the Dubai Palm Islands.” Omar Salah,
Dubai Debt Crisis: A Legal Analysis of the Nakheel Sukuk, 4 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 19, 19 (2010). For
other articles that discuss this specific Nakheel debt, see Simeon Kerr, Nakheel signs agreement with
trade creditors, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/3c22df10-5157-11df-bed900144feab49a; Asa Fitch, Clock ticking on Nakheel debt, THE NAT’L (Aug. 16, 2009), http://www.thenational.ae/business/banking/clock-ticking-on-nakheel-debt; Michael Rainey & Sara E. Carmody, King
& Spalding: Dubai World Restructuring – Decree No. 57, KING & SPAULDING (Dec. 14, 2009),
http://www.kslaw.com/library/publication/DubaiWorldRestructuring_DecreeNo57.pdf. Note, in the
next section of the paper, there will be further discussion of Nakheel, in particular, as it was the most
frequent player in non-insolvency DWT cases. For the discussion here, however, because this insolvency-based restructuring involved Dubai World as a conglomerate, Dubai World will be the focus,
rather than its subsidiaries.
136. See Wigglesworth, supra note 131. See also Sakoui, supra note 135.
137. Sakoui, supra note 135.
138. See id.
139. See id. Sakoui reports that Aurelius made a profit on the selling of this debt to Deutsche Bank.
Id.
140. See Wigglesworth, supra note 131; Sakoui, supra note 135; Simeon Kerr, Dubai World secures
deal to restructure $14.6bn debt, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7d8344dc9a67-11e4-8426-00144feabdc0.html; Telephone interview with Augusto Sasso, supra note 65.
141. See Kerr, supra note 140.
142. DWT/VAN/0001/2015 (1) Dubai World (2) Dubai World Group Finance Limited (3) Istithmar
World Holdings LLC (4) Istithmar World PJSC (5) Port & Free Zone World FZE-VAN Directions Order,
DUBAI WORLD TRIBUNAL (“DWT”) (Feb. 15, 2015), http://dubaiworldtribunal.ae/dwtvan00012015-1dubai-world-2-dubai-world-group-finance-limited-3-istithmar-world-holdings-llc-4-istithmar-worldpjsc-5-port-free-zone-world-fze/.
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cram-down Decree 57 motion in the Tribunal, if necessary. As it turned out, however, later that month Dubai World achieved “100 percent support”143 for the restructuring, resulting in the Tribunal issuing a final approval order on the new arrangement.144
The Drydocks and Dubai World insolvency cases highlight the power that Decree 57 had in helping to bring about resolutions to both these complicated restructuring matters. Both cases settled,145 but based on the information collected, it is
clear that the various parties saw the DWT as a legitimate body that had the authority and power to make findings that would indeed need to be followed. Rather than
risking an adverse judgment, the parties thus concluded that it would be in their
respective interests to settle.146

C.

The Non-Insolvency Cases

At the time of this writing, a swath of cases, unrelated to the abovementioned
insolvency issues has come before the DWT. Recall, the DWT had originally been
conceived expediting the financial restructuring of Dubai World. But because the
language of Decree 57 allowed for a broader interpretation of other Dubai Worldrelated cases to be heard in front of the DWT, the Tribunal took this opportunity to
serve as the arbiter of these separate disputes. Appendix A lists these other cases
that have entered onto the DWT’s docket. As the data shows, 38 have seen the
Tribunal issue a judgment, 16 settled before a formal order was made, 6 cases were
dismissed, and 26 were discontinued.
Of these 38 cases that reached verdict, 31 involved Nakheel – Dubai World’s
primary subsidiary, which had its own set of financial troubles after the collapse of
the real estate market in the U.A.E. (Nakheel was a party to 9 of the 15 cases that
settled and 18 of the ones in the remaining two categories.) Nakheel was “the biggest user of the DWT since its creation.”147
In analyzing the cases in which Nakheel was a party, several interesting observations emerge. To begin, in those cases that went to judgment, Nakheel prevailed
outright in only a relatively small number. These cases involved property development or contract for services. For example, in Penguin Marine Boat Services LLC
v. The World (where Nakheel was the defendant), the Tribunal ruled in favor of the
latter because of a lack of evidence that a sufficient contract even existed in the first
place.148 Similarly, in Futtain Hussein Fares Al Baddad v. Palm Deira LLC (where
again Nakheel was the main defendant), the Tribunal sided with Nakheel because
the claimant simply could not produce the agreement it sought to enforce. 149 In
another dispute, Nakheel also was able to stave off a complaint by dissatisfied

143. UPDATE 1-Dubai World’s debt restructuring gets 100 pct creditor backing, REUTERS (Feb. 15,
2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/dubai-world-restructuring-idUSL5N0VP06220150215.
144. See DWT, supra note 142.
145. Albeit with Drydocks, the settlement occurred after the cram-down order, whereas with Dubai
World it was before it. Id.
146. Id. Or as Mnookin and Kornhauser have classically argued, “bargain[…] in the shadow of the
law.” Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
147. Email from John Davidson, General Counsel, Nakheel, to Jayanth K. Krishnan (Sept 13, 2015).
148. Penguin Marine Boat Services LLC v. The World, DWT-0025-2010 (5/22/2011).
149. Futtain Hussein Fares Al Baddad v. Palm Deira LLC, DWT-0006-2010 (8/7/2011).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss2/8

22

Krishnan and Koster: An Innovative Matrix for Dispute Resolution: The Dubai World Trib

No. 2]

An Innovate Matrix

409

claimants from one of its construction projects, 150 and, Nakheel was permitted to
retain the earnest money it collected after an investment company decided to cancel
a construction project for which it had contracted.151
In three different cases, Nakheel served as the claimant, and it prevailed in
each. In The World LLC v. Al Memari Development Limited, Nakheel received a
default judgment because the defendant failed to meet its final payment on an installment contract.152 In Nakheel PJSC v. Al Meraikhi, though the parties had initially agreed to a financial restructuring, the defendant later sought to renege. The
Tribunal refused to allow the defendant to do so and ruled in favor of Nakheel. 153
In a third case, Nakheel had signed a contract to receive a license fee from the defendant, but when it came time for payment, the defendant refused. Nakheel sued
and subsequently won.154
Yet in most of the remaining cases that went to judgment, Nakheel was on the
losing end. The issue in several of these disputes involved claimants who argued
that Nakheel simply refused to follow through on deals that it had made. 155 Shokat
Dalal v. Nakheel PJSC156 exemplifies this point. In this case, the claimant was
planning to purchase a set of properties from Nakheel, but after the real estate market in Dubai collapsed, Nakheel no longer wished to sell. 157 The claimant was based
outside of Dubai; during the course of the proceeding, Nakheel was able to secure
an arrest notice against him, which deterred the claimant from wanting to return to
the Emirate.158 Nakheel, however, argued that it could not receive a fair hearing if
the claimant was not present in person.159 The Tribunal rejected this argument and

150. City D Investments Limited v. The World LLC & Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0024-2011 (9/19/2013).
151. Arady Alaman Real Estate Investments LLC v. The World, DWT-0036-2011 (9/26/2013).
152. The World LLC v. Al Memari Development Limited, DWT-0022-2011 (7/8/2014).
153. Nakheel PJSC v. Al Meraikhi, DWT-0028-2011 (9/21/2011).
154. The World LLC v. Penguin Marine Boat Services LLC, DWT-0008-2011 (2/6/2013).
155. See, e.g., CDG FZE v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0008-2010 (12/25/2014) (holding that the claimant
was entitled to damages from Nakheel, plus interest on those delayed payments that Nakheel had not yet
made); Paramount International Trading Limited v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0019-2010 (2/14/2011) (holding that Nakheel was bound to honor a contract that it had signed with the claimant); Nurol LLC v.
Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0011-2011 (8/4/2011); (holding that Nakheel could not unilaterally cancel a contract it signed simply because it was convenient to do so); Ahmed Butti Ahmed Almuhairi v. Nakheel
PJSC, DWT-0014-2011 (9/3/2013) (holding Nakheel to be bound to a discounted price on properties it
had contracted with the claimant); Proidea Contracting Interior Design LLC v. Nakheel, DWT-00202010 (9/3/2013) (holding that Nakheel was bound to pay the claimant for services for which it had contracted); Hedley International Emirates Contracting LLC v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT 0017-2011 (9/13/203)
(holding that just because Nakheel faced financial difficulties it still owed the respective claimants
money for services for which it (Nakheel) had contracted); relatedly, also see Reaction Project Management v. Dubai Maritime City, DWT-0039-2011 (9/3/2013) (holding Nakheel liable for consultancy fees
it received from the claimant); P & T Architects and Engineers LTD v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0022-2010
(11/22/2011); Technical Architects General Contracting Company LLC v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-00182010 (4/30/2013); Far East Investment Holdings Limited v. The World LLC, DWT-0027-2011
(11/11/2013) (holding Nakheel must pay a refund to the claimant for failure to build-up a plot in The
World Development); Gaber Nema Kenger v. The Palm Jebel Ali LLC, DWT-0009-2011 (7/8/2014)
and Azia Holding Limited v. The World, DWT-0040-2011 (12/25/2014) (holding in both cases that the
respective claimants were entitled to cancel a contract it signed with the defendant because of the latter’s
failure to perform).
156. Shokat Dalal v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0023-2010 (1/23/2014).
157. Id.
158. Id. Also see Email from Mark Beer, supra note 102.
159. Shokat Dalal v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0023-2010; Email from Mark Beer, supra note 102.
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said that so long as the claimant could appear via videoconference, Nakheel’s interests would be safeguarded.160 The claimant subsequently prevailed, but perhaps
more noteworthy, the decision was important because it confirmed the Tribunal’s
commitment to allow parties to access its services from around the world in a timely
and cost-savings manner.161
Then there are instances where Nakheel was accused of constructing properties
with deficiencies162 or failing to build a project altogether,163 and in both these types
of matters it lost as well. In fact, regarding the latter, consider an interesting case
that came before the Tribunal involving the intersection between property law, contract law, and religious liberty. In this matter, 164 the claimant was a trading company that had bought a parcel of land from Nakheel. After time passed and no
construction had been done on the project, the claimant approached Nakheel for an
explanation and was told that the site was classified as religiously holy. 165 As a
result, Nakheel was barred from proceeding with the construction. 166 At trial, the
trading company asked for restitution along with damages, and the Tribunal
agreed,167 holding that the religious prohibition on construction did not insulate
Nakheel from liability.168
Nakheel failed to prevail in another set of cases, this time involving high profile
employment law disputes. In the first matter, Nakheel’s former General Counsel,
David John Nicholson, sued the company, claiming that he had been terminated
with only one month’s notice when his contract required a notice period of three
months.169 The Tribunal found in Nicholson’s favor and awarded him more than
$200,000 USD in damages.170 (Although Nakheel was able to lower “a legal fees
bill claim by . . . [Nicholson] from AED 473,119 ($128,803) to AED 132,000
($36,000) at a [subsequent] Dubai World Tribunal costs hearing.” 171)
In the second case, Nakheel’s former Chief Executive Officer, Chris O’Donnell, sued the company in June 2011 on breach of contract grounds.172 O’Donnell
had led Nakheel for five years before departing, and argued that the company owed
him a set of incentive packages.173 In response, Nakheel contended that O’Donnell
160. Shokat Dalal v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0023-2010; Email from Mark Beer, supra note 102.
161. Shokat Dalal v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0023-2010; Email from Mark Beer, supra note 102.
162. Vinod Kumar Dang v. Jumeirah Islands LLC, DWT-0003-2010 (3/9/2011).
163. Samer Farhan Farhat v. International City – Nakheel, DWT-0018-2011 (9/3/2013).
164. Greenfield Trading Company FZC v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0038-2011 (11/26/2015).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. David John Nicholson v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0020-2011 (2/2/2012).
170. Id; see also Shane McGinley, Ex-Nakheel CEO’s Legal Battle May Spur New Lawsuits, ARABIAN
BUS. (Dec. 4, 2011), http://m.arabianbusiness.com/ex-nakheel-ceo-s-legal-battle-may-spur-new-lawsuits-433241.html.
171. Duncan Hare, Nakheel Lawyers Reduce Former Counsel’s Bill, CONSTR. WEEK ONLINE (Jan. 29,
2012), http://www.constructionweekonline.com/article-15439-nakheel-lawyers-reduce-former-counsels-claim-bill/. Note, there was a separate case, David John Nicholson v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-00402014, (10/27/2014) that involved the claimant bringing a claim that he was owed an 80% discount on a
piece of property he purchased from Nakheel. The parties discontinued the case jointly, and the Tribunal
gave a consent order to that effect.
172. Chris O’Donnell v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0035-2011 (1/23/2014); Shane McGinley, Former CEO
Chris O’Donnell Sues Nakheel, ARABIAN BUS. (June 23, 2011), http://www.arabianbusiness.com/former-ceo-chris-o-donnell-sues-nakheel-406646.html#.V1WasbgrLDc.
173. Chris O’Donnell v. Nakheel PJSC; McGinley, supra note 172.
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had simply “decided to leave Nakheel following five years spent with the company”174 before his contract had even expired; thus, he deserved no further pay-outs.
Nakheel also questioned the jurisdictional authority of the Tribunal, saying that the
case “should have been brought to the Ministry of Labour.”175 Nakheel additionally
cited O’Donnell’s poor performance as justification for not delivering the promised
incentive packages.176 In February 2012, the Tribunal issued its judgment. It held
that the contract was clear on the covenants between the company and O’Donnell,
and that Nakheel owed more than $3 million in incentive payments to its former
CEO, along with nearly a quarter of a million dollars in wages for days he had
worked but had not received compensation. 177 The Tribunal also rejected the argument that it was not the proper venue to adjudicate this claim.178 The case clearly
involved a matter relating to a Dubai World subsidiary, and given the language of
Decree 57 (broadly interpreted), the Tribunal found no issue rendering a verdict in
this type of breach of contract dispute.179
As demonstrated by the above analysis, the Tribunal has been instrumental in
deciding a range of cases – both insolvency and non-insolvency based. In the concluding section, there will be an evaluation of what the Tribunal’s creation and its
operations have meant for Dubai and, more generally, for those who study the interplay between external and local actors working within a domestic context – but
a context which has definite global implications.

V.

CONCLUSION

In more theoretical terms, this study has sought to reframe the old and rather
tired debate over the extent to which outside legal experts who enter a domestic
landscape cause more harm than good. Section II provided an in-depth account of

174. Chris O’Donnell v. Nakheel PJSC; McGinley, supra note 172; also for quotation, see Ben Roberts,
Nakheel’s Chris O’Donnell Quits as CEO, CONSTR. WEEK ONLINE (June 9, 2011), http://www.constructionweekonline.com/article-12737-nakheels-chris-odonnell-quits-as-ceo/.
175. Shane McGinley, Chris O’Donnell Wins $3.7M Legal Battle with Nakheel, ARABIAN BUS. (Feb.
9, 2012),
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/chris-o-donnell-wins-3-7m-legal-battle-with-nakheel444453.html#.V1Wd-7grLDc [hereinafter McGinley, O’Donnell wins].
176. Id.; see also Chris O’Donnell v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0035-2011 (1/23/2014).
177. McGinley, O’Donnell Wins, supra note 175; Chris O’Donnell v. Nakheel PJSC.
178. Chris O’Donnell v. Nakheel PJSC, DWT-0035-2011 (1/23/2014).
179. In fact, in a handful of other cases, the Tribunal asserted its jurisdiction where non-insolvency was
at play. See, e.g. Simon James Arrol v. Jumeirah Heights LLC, DWT-0016-2011 (6/8/2012) (holding
that the respondent, a Dubai World subsidiary, was required to pay the claimant an award issued by the
Dubai International Arbitration Centre); Hedley International Emirates Contracting LLC v. Nakheel
PJSC, DWT-0006-2011 (6/18/2012) (holding that based on an agreement between the parties, whereby
Hedley had cancelled the contract, Nakheel was not entitled to any payment); M/S Al Falak International
Limited v. M/S Nakheel International Co., DWT-0025-2011 (1/23/2014) (holding that Nakheel was liable to the claimant who had paid to reserve a plot of land but where Nakheel did not follow through and
complete the signing of the agreement and sale of the property); Nakheel PJSC v. Souq Residence FZCO,
DWT-0021-2010 (2/23/2014) (holding against Nakheel for not following through on a contract). Several
months later, this case was settled between the two parties. See Nakheel and Souq Residences reach
agreement
on
Palm
Jumeirah’s
Golden
Mile,
NAKHEEL
(Nov.
16,
2014),
http://www.nakheel.com/en/media/news/nakheel-and-souq-residences-reach-agreement-on-palmjumeirahs-golden-mile.
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the literature that has focused on this subject. Although there are certainly important and valuable exceptions to the rule,180 much of the extant research examines
this topic from a binary perspective: either the arriving external actors help positively transform the society upon which they are working or they are neo-colonizers
who exploit a new environment for instrumental purposes.181 In fact, several works
that concentrate on this latter point often emphasize how it is actually indigenous
actors who are far more significant in shaping the direction of policy, culture, rights,
language, and governance of the domestic environment than the interloping external
figures.182
Yet the scholarship examining this issue, to-date, has paid far too little attention
to the exciting developments currently occurring within one intriguing context –
Dubai. Dubai is a setting that is heavily engaged with the international economy.
It is a global marketplace with globally-sophisticated players who come from all
over the world. Moreover, its domestic actors – lawyers, business leaders, civil
society members, and government officials – are equally as sophisticated. These
domestic actors recognize their city’s privileged status not only within the region
but around the globe as well. The narrative, therefore, of how the financial crisis of
2008 and 2009 affected Dubai is telling, namely because international and domestic
stakeholders recognized the need to work in tandem from the outset. The actors
from abroad did not have ambitions of colonizing Dubai; nor could they have succeeded even if they wished.183 Similarly, the domestic actors did not view the foreign counterparts as engaging in unwanted encroachment. 184 The successful interplay between the external experts and their internal colleagues to create and successfully operationalize the Dubai World Tribunal adds a nuanced, as-of-yet untold
story to the elite theory literature.185
As this article demonstrates, lawyers, judges, business consultants, and accountants from abroad, together with a range of Dubai officials, cooperatively
drafted a decree that ultimately met with the Emirate Ruler’s approval. Moreover,
these colleagues helped launch a key dispute resolution institution that provided
immense confidence to local and international investors. 186 Consider what exists
within this Arabic-speaking, Islamic-governed environment. There is a Westernbased, non-appealable financial dispute resolution Tribunal that uses English, adheres to American and British legal principles, has foreign judges, and oversees all
claims that relate to Dubai World and its subsidiaries, regardless of whether they

180. See DEZALAY & GARTH, PALACE WARS, supra note 17 (noting how sensitive globalized lawyers
do take into account local context, culture, and actors); ABEL & LEWIS, supra note 20(explaining how
lawyers in common law countries can indeed be sensitive to domestic legal needs)
181. See discussion supra Section II.
182. Id.; see, e.g., Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield, supra note 17 (noting how many Indian legal academics, to the observations made by the Ford Foundation’s American law professor consultants, were
sophisticated in thinking about legal education and the legal profession); Krishnan, Academic SAILERS,
supra note 17 (noting how the premise of Ford’s legal education work in Africa was to rely greatly on
local law professors and students for guidance).
183. See discussion supra Section III.D.
184. See discussion supra Section III.D.
185. See discussion supra Section III.D.
186. See discussion supra Section III.D and Section IV.
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are insolvency-focused or not. Furthermore, the Tribunal has regularly and thoughtfully referenced, respected, and interpreted U.A.E. law. A forthcoming report by
the Tribunal’s staff outlines this point in detail.187
Specifically, the report tracks how in several areas – civil procedure, real estate,
commercial law, and labor law – various domestic statutory provisions appear relevant when combing through the facts of the cases that have come before the Tribunal. As the report discusses, the Tribunal indeed examines U.A.E. law and then
analyzes its applicability before rendering a verdict.188 The Tribunal’s engagement
in this manner clearly has helped it retain a strong sense of legitimacy and respect
from the Dubai government, even though the government has been on the losing
side of many cases. As the report concludes:[the] Tribunal’s interpretations of UAE
law show that the outcome in many cases will be the same under Civil and Common
law principles. While the Tribunal may have a different thought process for interpreting UAE law, using many Common law principles, the end result is consistent
with UAE law. The exercise of interpreting UAE law in the Dubai World Tribunal
shows that Civil and Common law traditions share many aspects of substantive law.
These traditions both seek to maximise justice and are thus not as different as they
may seem.189 It is worth pondering why the Tribunal has worked so well within a
context that has never seen such an institution in the past. In part, the answer lies
in how cataclysmic the financial crisis at the time was, which required the government to take unprecedented action or else risk the collapse of its entire economic
system. Relying solely on nationalist means of remedying Dubai World’s problems
was not an option. The local Dubai courts were not equipped to handle these complicated cases; and the existing laws on the books could not fully address the monumental and diverse array of claims and defenses being made by creditors and debtors, respectively. These desperate times called for bold, creative, and global
measures to confront a situation that the Dubai government had never witnessed.
In Aristotelian terms, it was essential for Dubai to embrace a new approach for
tackling the crisis if it wished to remain a relevant, sovereign, and economic player
on the world’s stage.
Another part of the story, however, is that those involved, from all sides, were
not caricatures of stereotypical outsiders or insiders. Surely, each of the pivotal
figures here had objectives and instrumental ends, but they were complex, with layered identities, motivations, and aspirations. And finally, globalization deeply influenced the way the Tribunal has functioned. The opportunities, knowledge, and
information brought about by technology (not to mention the seamlessness of
travel) have enabled easier communication between the external experts and Dubai
officials, paving the way for a solution to the Emirate’s crisis. In sum, all these
experiences should serve as a model for scholars of dispute resolution and for policymakers in other markets seeking to build strong rule of law regimes – regimes

187. See DUBAI WORLD TRIBUNAL STAFF REPORT, DUBAI WORLD TRIBUNAL INTERPRETATIONS OF
U.A.E. LAW (forthcoming 2016).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 13. This idea of British-style courts considering local laws before reaching an opinion has
been documented in the literature in detail – namely during the colonial era. (See, e.g., Marc Galanter
and Jayanth K. Krishnan, Personal Law and Human Rights in India and Israel, 34 ISR. L. REV. 98
(2000)). The situation here of the development of a “body of case law showing the Dubai World Tribunal’s interpretations of UAE law” in this type of post-colonial context does appear novel. See DUBAI
WORLD TRIBUNAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 187, at 1.
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that can be viewed as legitimate and equitable by both international and domestic
stakeholders for generations to come. 190

Appendix A

Settled /
Judgment
Judgment

Judgment

Case
Number
DWT00192010

DWT00032010

Parties
Paramount International Trading
Limited v.
Nakheel PJSC

Vinod Kumar
Dang v. Jumeirah
Islands LLC

Date of
Filing Final Judgment
2/14/2011

Date
Added to
Docket
10/10/2010

3/9/2011

6/13/2010

Summary
The Claimant
believed they
had a valid
consolidation
agreement for
the purchase of
property from
Nakheel, but
Nakheel said
that the consolidation
agreement had
not been approved and
thus they could
not move forward with the
deal.
The contract
was for the
sale and purchase of a villa
to be constructed in the
Jumeirah Islands. The
property was
delivered to
the Claimant,
but it had deficiencies and
the Claimant
claimed damages from the
Respondent.
The Arbitral
Tribunal
awarded damages, and Respondent
(Jumierah)
submitted an
application to

Is
Nakheel
involved?
Yes

Did the
creditors
/ claimant
prevail?
Yes - The
Tribunal
found that
Nakheel
was contractually
bound to
continue
with the
consolidation.

Yes

Yes - Respondent
was out of
time, so
the Tribunal ruled
that its application
to nullify
the award
for the
Claimant
was invalid.

190. The authors received permission from the Registrar of the DWT to summarize and excerpt, from
the DWT website and database, the information presented in the below Appendix. The Registrar oversees and is in charge of the management and compilation of the DWT cases in the database. Citations
per case also are provided below.
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Judgment

DWT00262010

Souq Residences
FZCO v. Nakheel
PJSC

4/14/2011

12/20/2010

Judgment

DWT00192011

Al Mazaya Real
Estate FZ LLC v.
Limitless LLC

5/9/2011

4/18/2011

Judgment

DWT00252010

Penguin Marine
Boats Services
LLC v. The World
LLC

5/22/2011

12/20/2010

Judgment

DWT00112011

Nurol LLC v.
Nakheel PJSC

8/4/2011

3/2/2011

Judgment

DWT00062010

Futtain Hussein
Fares Al Baddad
v. Palm Deira
LLC

8/7/2011

8/5/2010
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the DWT to
nullify the
award to the
Claimant. The
Tribunal determined that he
was “out of
time.”
This was consolidated into
DWT-00212010.
Claimant entered a purchase and sale
agreement
with Defendant for property. Claimant
paid for it, but
there was a
dispute with
the Defendant.
Defendant
took title back.
Claimant seeks
to set aside or
amend Orders
of Arbitration.
Penguin Boats
claimed that it
entered an
agreement to
provide services to The
World, but the
services were
never required.

Claimant was
supposed to
develop property for Defendant, but
Defendant canceled the contract for convenience.
Claimant paid
Palm Deira
380,000 for
property, but
the purchase
fell through.

Yes

N/A

No

No - Ruling for
Defendant.

Yes

No - The
evidence
was not
sufficient
to prove
that there
was an
agreement.
Judgment
for The
World.
Nakheel is
not entitled to
money
under the
Advance
Payment
Guarantee.
No - The
Claimant
could not
produce
the Reservation
Contract.
Defendant
prevails.
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Yes
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Judgment

DWT00282011

Nakheel PJSC v.
Al Meraikhi General Contracting

9/21/2011

6/8/2011

Judgment

DWT00222010

P&T Architects
and Engineers
LTD v. Nakheel
PJSC

11/22/2011

12/12/2010

Judgment

DWT00202011

David John Nicholson v.
Nakheel PJSC

2/2/2012

4/19/2011

Judgment

DWT00162011

Simon James Arrol v. Jumeirah
Heights LLC

6/18/2012

4/3/2011

Judgment

DWT00062011

Hedley international Emirates
Contracting LLC
v. Nakheel PJSC

1/27/2013

2/2/2011
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The parties entered into a
contract, and
later they entered into restructuring
agreements.
Defendant
never executed
the restructuring agreements.
The information in the
documents is
vague, but this
is a contractual
dispute between the architects at a
property and
Nakheel.
Claimant was
an employee
of Defendant
who was terminated. Defendant withheld his benefits, and
Claimant sues
for these benefits.
Claimant
wanted enforcement of a
Dubai International Arbitration Centre final award.

Yes

Yes Claimant
is entitled
to relief,
and Defendant
must execute the
restructuring agreement.

Yes

Yes - The
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upheld the
arbitrator’s judgment that
Nakheel
should
pay the
Claimant.
Yes - The
Claimant
is entitled
to these
benefits.

Nakheel entered into an
agreement
with a contractor to do work.
However, the
contractor terminated the
agreement, and
Nakheel
wanted money
for the cancelation.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes - Respondent
must pay
the final
award and
the costs
of this action.
Yes - The
contractor
does not
have to
pay
Nakheel.
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The World LLC v.
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Boat Services
LLC

2/6/2013

2/7/2011

Judgment

DWT00182010

Technical Architects General
Contracting
Company LLC v.
Nakheel PJSC

4/30/2013

10/7/2010

Judgment

DWT00292010

Said Ali S Alangari v. Limitless
LLC

6/3/2013

12/27/2010

Judgment

DWT00202010

Proidea Contracting and Interior Design LLC
v. Nakheel

9/3/2013

10/19/2010
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for Defendant
on a project. In
the contract,
Defendant was
to pay Claimant a license
fee. Defendant
claimed
Claimant was
in breach of
the contract,
and Defendant
refused to pay
the license fee.
Breach of contract claim.

Yes

Yes - Defendant is
required
to pay
Claimant
AED
7,500,000.

Yes

The Claimant
wanted to buy
land from the
developer, the
Defendant.
There was no
purchase and
sale agreement, but the
Claimant paid
10% of the
purchase price.
The development never
happened, and
Claimant
wants its
money back.
The Claimant
claims that
Nakheel hired
it as its contractor, but
Nakheel
claims they
never reached
an agreement.
The Tribunal
determined
that Nakheel
did inform the
contractor that
its quotation
had been approved.

No

Yes Nakheel
must pay
the Claimant a default judgment.
Yes - Defendant
must repay
Claimant
plus 1%
interest.

Yes

Yes - The
Tribunal
determined that
the Defendant
must pay
the Claimant.
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9/3/2013
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Hedley International Emirates
Contracting LLC
v. Nakheel PJSC

9/3/2013

4/5/2011

Judgment

DWT00182011
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Farhat v. International City –
Nakheel

9/3/2013

4/18/2011

Judgment

DWT00212011

Auld Alliance
Trading FZCO v.
Drydocks World
LLC

9/3/2013

5/4/2011

Judgment

DWT00392011

Reaction Project
Management v.
Dubai Maritime
City

9/3/2013

7/14/2011
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Yes
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is entitled
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Yes - The
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must pay
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for the
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City D Investments Limited v.
The World LLC
& Nakheel PJSC
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Judgment
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Real Estate Investments LLC v.
The World LLC
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Judgment
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Far East Investment Holdings
Limited v. The
World LLC
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the plots
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for a plot of
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Judgment
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property from
the Claimant
and made two
advance payments. The
parties did not
move forward
with the transaction, and the
Defendant did
not repay the
Claimant.
Claimant
wanted the
purchase and
sale agreements to be
terminated
since the Defendant had
not started

[Vol. 2016
Yes

Yes - The
Tribunal
determined that
Nakheel
must pay
the Claimant.

Yes

Yes Judgment
in favor of
the Claimant.

Yes

Yes - The
Tribunal
determined that
the Claimant was
entitled to
these
packages.

Yes

No - The
Tribunal
held that
Nakheel
must pay
the Defendant.

Yes

Yes - The
contracts
become
void due
to nonregistration, so
the Claimant wins.
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work on the
projects.

Judgment

DWT00222011

The World LLC v.
Al Memari Development Limited

7/8/2014

5/19/2011

Judgment

DWT00082010

CDG FZE v.
Nakheel PJSC

12/25/2014

8/19/2010

Judgment

DWT00402011

Azia Holdings
Limited v. The
World LLC

12/25/2014

7/24/2011
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The Claimant
and Defendant
entered into a
purchase and
sale agreement, and Defendant never
paid off the final installment.
This case was
brought because defendants had not
begun payment
after a judgment was
made against
them. Claimant now claims
that interest is
due on the delinquent payments. The
DWT approved an interest rate of
four percent
per year from
the date of the
first judgment
(September
2013) until the
date of payment.
Claimant invested in Defendant’s
World Island
Plot. Defendant agreed to
sell a plot to
the Claimant
under a Reservation Contract. Defendant has not met
its obligations
under the Reservation Contract.

Yes

Yes Claimant’s request for
default
judgment
is granted.

Yes

Yes - Defendants
in earlier
action
must pay
Claimant
interest on
judgment
against
them.

Yes

Yes Claimant
is entitled
to cancelation of
the Reservation
Contract.
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Judgment

DWT00022014

Gulf Boats Trading v. Dry Docks
World LLC

3/12/2015

1/30/2014

Judgment

DWT00292011

Nakheel PJSC v.
Hedley International Emirates
Contracting LLC

10/19/2015

6/8/2011

Judgment

DWT00072010

Khalid Hassan A.
Al Qahtani v.
Limitless LLC
and Pinnacle
Business Towners
Company Limited

11/19/2015

9/21/2010

Judgment

DWT00382011

Greenfield Trading Company
FZC v. Nakheel
PJSC

11/26/2015

7/11/2011

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss2/8

[Vol. 2016

Claimant
parked its ship
at Defendant’s
dock, and it
sank twice.
Claimant
claims that Defendant is responsible for
its ship sinking
due to Defendant’s negligence.
Same facts as
case directly
above.

No

No - Defendant
was not
responsible for the
ship sinking.

Yes

Claimant put
money down
for the purchase of property, but he
later wrote to
Defendant asking for a refund because
he no longer
wished to
move forward.
Claimant purchased a plot
from Defendant. After paying the purchase price,
Claimant was
notified by Defendant that
this land was
classified as a
holy land and
Claimant could
not use it for
its intended
purpose.
Claimant
wants its
money back
plus damages.

No

There are
no other
documents.
This claim
was likely
settled
outside of
the Tribunal or
consolidated into
DWT00282011.
Yes Claimant
was entitled to refund of
the money
plus interest.

Yes

Yes Claimant
is entitled
to return
of its
money
and damages.
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Judgment

DWT00052013

M/S Platinum
Services Company v. M/S Dubai Port World

Ongoing Most recent hearing on
10/21/15

12/4/2013

Settled

DWT00162010

Gulf Developers
FZC v. The
World LLC

3/30/2011

10/6/2010

Settled

DWT00172010

Frontline Developers FZC v. The
World LLC

3/30/2011

Settled

DWT00142010

Dalkia Middle
East FZE v. Limitless LLC

Settled

DWT00122010

Settled

DWT00102010

423
Claimant was
a contractor
who worked
with Defendant. Claimant
sent workers to
Defendant’s
properties. After Defendant
moved its location, Claimant claimed its
workers went
on strike and
he had to close
his business.
Claimant
wants damages
from defendant.
Claimant canceled the reservation contract
and asks for a
refund of the
amount paid.

No

There was
a trial, but
there is no
document
to determine who
won in
this case.

Yes

10/6/2010

Claimant canceled the reservation contract
and asks for a
refund of the
amount paid.

Yes

4/5/2011

9/1/2010

No

Gulf Height Investments Holding v. The World
LLC

7/28/2011

9/30/2010

Breach of contract claim. No
other information on
website.
Claimant
claims Defendant wrongfully
canceled their
contracts. The
description
was very
vague.

The parties entered into
an agreement, and
the Tribunal issued
a consent
order.
The parties entered into
an agreement, and
the Tribunal issued
a consent
order.
Case
closed before judgment.

Jumeirah Islands
LLC v. Vinod Kumar Dang

8/4/2011

8/26/2010

No information on
website.

Yes

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

Yes

The parties entered into
an agreement, and
the Tribunal issued
a consent
order.
Case
closed after case
management conference.
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Settled

DWT00052010

Khalid Rangoonwala v. Al
Nakheel Company

11/22/2011

8/5/2010

Settled

DWT00112010

Bin Belaila Baytur General Contracting LLC v.
Nakheel PJSC

11/22/2011

9/30/2010

Settled

DWT00072011

Wilbur Smith Associates Inc. v.
Limitless LLC

11/22/2011

2/7/2011

Settled

DWT00022012

Suha Mahmoud
Salem v. Nakheel
PJSC

3/20/2012

2/6/2012

Settled

DWT00152010

Global Realty
Partners FZC v.
The World LLC

9/3/2013

10/6/2010

Settled

DWT00022011

Limitless LLC v.
Thani Rashid
Eissa Al Muhairi

9/3/2013

1/6/2011

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss2/8

[Vol. 2016

A water pipe
owned by
Nakheel burst
and flooded
the street, also
flooding
Claimant’s car.
The parties entered into an
agreement, and
the Tribunal
drafted a consent order.
Claimant
claims that Defendant has
failed to make
payments required by their
contracts.

Yes

Consent
order –
Nakheel
will pay
Claimant
for damage to car.

Yes

Claimant
claims that Defendant owes
Claimant for
the costs of
consultancy
services performed during
a construction
project.
Claimant was
hired by Defendant and
claims that his
employment
was terminated
arbitrarily.
Claimant canceled the reservation contract
and asks for a
refund of the
amount paid.

No

Parties entered into
an agreement before judgment. The
Tribunal
issued a
consent
order.
The parties settled
outside of
the Tribunal.

Claimant and
Defendant
were both supposed to pay
for a development project,
but only the
Claimant paid.

No

Yes

Yes

The case
was
closed before
reaching
the Tribunal.
The parties entered into
an agreement, and
the Tribunal issued
a consent
order.
Respondent agreed
to the
terms of
the Consent Order.
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Settled

DWT00052011

Limitless LLC v.
Mohammed Matar Mohamed Al
Marri

1/23/2014

1/26/2011

Settled

DWT00032014

Hamburg Sudamerikanische
DampfshifffahrtsGesellschaft KG
v. DP World
Limited

12/22/2014

2/26/2014

Settled

DWT00012014

Regional Development Consortium LLC v.
Drydocks World

4/15/2015

1/26/2014

Settled

DWT00132011

Hedley International Emirates
Contracting LLC
v. Nakheel PJSC

10/19/2015

3/10/2011

Settled

DWT00012010

Asmaa Abd El
Ghaffar Khalil v.
Limitless L.L.C

11/8/2010

4/5/2010
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Claimant built
a building for
the Defendant,
and Defendant
never paid
them for constructing the
building.
Defendants
damaged
goods of the
Claimant while
operating a
crane. Claimant wants Defendant to pay
for the price of
those goods.
Claimant entered into an
Agreement
with Defendant to be its
sales agent.
Claimant
claims he is
entitled to
commission
from the work
done on the
buildings.
Under settlement documents,
Nakheel was
to allow
Hedley to
complete a
specific contract. Nakheel
limited the
scope of that
contract,
breaching the
settlement document.
Claimant had a
3-year contract
to work for
Dubai World,
and Dubai
World canceled the contract before it
was over. After the reply
was filed, the
case was
closed.

No

No

There was
a consent
order, and
both parties settled
outside of
the Tribunal.
The parties entered into
a consent
order before trial.

No

There was
a confidential
settlement
agreement.

Yes

Settled after case
management conference –
no documents.

No

The claim
was resolved
and an order was
issued on
Nov. 1
2010. No
further
documents are
available,
because
the order
has been
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kept private as
this is a
small
claim.

Discontinued

DWT00242010

Rhoda Giga Developers Limited
v. The World
LLC

2/13/2011

12/15/2010

Discontinued

DWT00042010

Mr. Raja Hani
Ghanma v.
Jumeirah Golf
Estates LLC

4/14/2011

8/5/2010

Discontinued

DWT00272010

Limitless LLC v.
Abdullah
Khamees Jumma
Hareb

5/15/2011

12/26/2010

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss2/8

The Claimant
entered into a
purchase and
sale agreement
with The
World. The
Claimant
wanted to consolidate the
purchase of the
properties, and
The World approved the
consolidation.
A few months
later, The
World revoked
the approval
for consolidation.
Employment
contract claim.
No other information on
website.

Yes

The
Claimant
discontinued the
action before the
Tribunal
made its
judgment.

Yes

The Claimant
handed over
this building
after construction to the Defendant even
though the Defendant had
failed to pay
the money he
owed. The Defendant
claimed he
was gifted the
land and building and thus
owes no
money.

No

The
Claimant
discontinued the
claim
without
any other
information.
Claimant
filed a notice of
discontinuance.
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Discontinued

DWT00322011

The World LLC
v. Asian Development Limited

6/12/2011

6/12/2011

Same facts as
the case directly above.

Yes

Discontinued

DWT00022010

Trinet Outdoor
Advertising v.
Nakheel

7/24/2011

5/23/2010

Breach of contract claim. No
other information on
website.

Yes

Discontinued

DWT00092010

Octopus Advertising LLC v. Ibn
Battuta Mall LLC

8/4/2011

8/23/2010

No

Discontinued

DWT00032011

Limitless v.
Yousuf Mohamed Ameen
Kazim

1/15/2012

1/6/2011

Claimant provided advertising services to
he Defendant,
and the Defendant has not
paid the invoices.
Same as directly above,
but against another Defendant.

Discontinued

DWT00282010

Limitless LLC v.
Abdulla Ali Abdulla Al Janahi

4/19/2012

12/26/2010

Same as case
directly above.

No

Discontinued

DWT00102011

Al Shafar General Contracting
Co LLC v.
Nakheel PJSC

2/26/2013

3/2/2011

Yes

Discontinued

DWT00332011

John Viola & Ian
Charles Mathison
v. Jumeirah Golf
Estates LLC &
Nakheel PJSC

4/3/2013

6/14/2011

This was an arbitration claim.
Defendant
hired the
Claimant to do
work, and Defendant gave
Claimant an
advance. Defendant canceled the contract, and
Claimant did
not pay back
the advance.
Claimants entered into a
purchase and
sale agreement
for properties
from Defendant. Defendant
was to draft
new purchase
and sale agreements but did
not, and
Claimants

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

No

Yes

No further
documents
available.
The
Claimant
discontinued the
claim
without
any other
information.
The
Claimant
discontinued his
claim before judgment.
Consolidated with
DWT00272010 and
DWT00282010.
Same as
case directly
above.
The
Claimant
discontinued its
claim.

The Tribunal discontinued
the claim.
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were never
granted access
to the properties.

Discontinued

DWT00232011

Jeroen Van Der
Geer v. Nakheel
PJSC

9/3/2013

6/2/2011

Discontinued

DWT00302011

Alalamiya Alalolla Contracting
LLC v. Nakheel
PJSC

9/3/2013

6/9/2011

Discontinued

DWT00312011

The World LLC
v. Kleindienst
Properties Limited

9/3/2013

6/12/2011

Discontinued

DWT00343011

CHI Development Group Limited v. Nakheel
PJSC

9/3/2013

6/21/2011

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss2/8

Defendant
agreed to let
Claimant pay a
reduced price
for a piece of
property, but
later Defendant changed its
mind and said
the price
would not be
reduced.
Claimant carried out various construction projects
for Defendant,
and Defendant
never paid
Claimant for
this work.
Claimant and
Defendant entered into a
purchase and
sale agreement
for property.
Defendant was
to pay the entire purchase
price, but has
only paid 30%
to the Claimant.
Claimant entered into purchase and sale
agreements
with the seller,
the Defendant.
Claimant made
substantial
payments, but
Defendant
failed to deliver infrastructure on
the project.
Claimant was
unable to hand

Yes

The case
was
closed before hearing in
front of
the Tribunal.

Yes

This claim
was
stayed by
the Tribunal.

Yes

The claim
was discontinued.

Yes

Claimant
filed a notice of
discontinuance.
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over the properties to purchasers.

Discontinued

DWT00022013

Mouchel Middle
East Limited v.
Limitless LLC

5/8/2014

6/5/2013

Discontinued

DWT00432011

Oxford Strategic
Consulting v. Dubai World

5/9/2013

8/2/2011

Discontinued

DWT00042014

Reeyaz Moosa v.
Jumeirah Golf
Estates LLC

10/27/2015

6/8/2014

Discontinued

DWT00412011

David John Nicholson v.
Nakheel PJSC

10/27/2015

7/31/2011

Discontinued

DWT00422011

Dubai Multi
Commodities
Centre Authority
v. Nakheel PJSC

11/30/2015

8/1/2011
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Breach of contract claim.
Claim form is
sealed.
Breach of contract claim.
There are no
documents
available.
“Ratification
of award”
claim. The
claim document is sealed.

No

The claim
was discontinued.

No

Claimant purchased property from
Nakheel and
paid 80% of
the purchase
price. Claimant was entitled to a discount on this
purchase, but
Defendant informed him
that he would
not receive this
discount.
Claimant
wants this discount to be applied to the
purchase.
Breach of contract claim.
There are no
documents
available.

Yes

The claim
was discontinued
on Sept.
21 2011.
The Parties
agreed to
discontinue the
claim on
Oct. 27
2015. The
Tribunal
issued a
Consent
Order.
The Parties
agreed to
discontinue the
claim on
Oct. 27
2015. The
Tribunal
issued a
Consent
Order.

No

Yes

The case
was
closed by
the Tribunal due to
non-activity of the
Parties.
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Discontinued

DWT00122011

Mr. Magdy El
Raddaf & Mrs.
Carmen El Raddaf v. Marina
Residences LLC

11/30/2015

3/9/2011

Breach of contract claim. No
documents
available.

No

Dismissed

DWT00012011

Gammon & Billmoria LLC v.
Nakheel PJSC

1/5/2011

1/4/2011

Yes

Dismissed

DWT00042011

Paramount International Trading
Limited v.
Nakheel PJSC

5/3/2011

1/25/2011

This dispute
centered
around a down
payment on
property and
how much was
to be paid in
advance/how
much should
be credited to
the eventual
purchase.
Claimants
claim that they
were led by
Nakheel to believe that they
would receive
zero-balance
financial statements on their
properties.

Dismissed

DWT00262011

A.A.P.D. Real
Estate Broker v.
Nakheel

5/6/2013

6/2/2011

Defendant did
not pay Claimant its commission fees
for acting as a
real estate broker for the Defendant.

Yes

Dismissed

DWT00372011

Mustafa Rasm
Mustafa Al Khamash v. International City LLC

5/22/2013

7/4/2011

Claimant entered into a
purchase
agreement
with Defendant. Defendant
was to turn
property over
to Claimant by
a certain date
and failed to
do so. The
Claimant
wants the Tribunal to cancel
the contract.

Yes

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss2/8

Yes

The case
was
closed by
the Tribunal due to
non-activity of the
Parties.
No - The
Claimant’s application
was dismissed.

No Claimants
are not
entitled to
the declarations
sought in
this trial.
The claim
is dismissed.
No - The
Tribunal
dismissed
the claim
because
AAPD
did not act
as a broker. Defendant
wins.
Claimant’s application
was dismissed
because
this must
be decided in
DIAC arbitration.
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Dismissed

DWT00012013

CDM Smith Inc.
v. Nakheel PJSC

9/3/2013

1/2/2013

Dismissed

DWT00152011

Sao Paulo Development Ltd v.
Nakheel PJSC

10/22/2013

3/24/2011
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Defendant
hired Claimant
as a consultant,
but it was unable to pay the
consultancy
fees. Defendant commenced financial restructuring. Claimant
wants a declaratory judgment
that the Tribunal has jurisdiction.
Defendant approved Claimant’s consolidation agreement to consolidate the island property
and transfer
the funds previously paid
towards different plots. Defendant later
disapproved
the agreement.

Yes

The Tribunal did
not have
jurisdiction to
hear the
claim.
This is an
arbitration
claim.

Yes

No Claimants
did not
prove that
Nakheel
was
bound by
the contract. The
claim is
dismissed.
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